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As the nation moves away from the policies that built a criminal 
justice system bent on mass incarceration, it is an appropriate time to 
reassess a sentencing regime that has doomed thousands of individuals 
convicted of nonviolent offenses to die in prison. Over the last thirty 
years, those policies have resulted in more than 3,000 offenders across 
the country receiving life sentences without the possibility of parole 
when they were convicted of a nonviolent crime. While it seems clear 
to many today that this harsh punishment is inappropriate for offenses 
that involved no physical harm to other people, the individuals serving 
these sentences continue to face life and death in prison. The Eighth 
Amendment offers these offenders an opportunity to demonstrate the 
unconstitutionality of their punishment to the Supreme Court—the 
institution in the best position to redress these excessive sentences of a 
bygone era. 
This Article analyzes the claim that there is a national consensus 
against life without parole sentences for individuals convicted of non-
violent offenses. First, it defines the problem, exploring how and why 
some offenders received life without parole sentences for nonviolent 
crime. This entails a look at the historical development of a series of 
harsh sentencing policies that made nonviolent offenses punishable by 
life without the possibility of parole. The historical developments are 
then traced through to current times to explain the seismic shift in how 
leaders in all three branches of government approach punishing low-
level and nonviolent crimes. 
This Article situates the punishment in the Eighth Amendment 
context. How have the Supreme Court’s previous Eighth Amendment 
rulings framed the relevant constitutional questions? And how can a 
change in the way the Court considers the link between the nature of 
the offense and the challenged punishment create new possibilities? 
This Article explores how treating individuals sentenced to life without 
parole for nonviolent offenses as a discrete category based on the nature 
of the crimes can alter the Eighth Amendment framework that the 
Court will use to determine the punishment’s constitutionality. The 
unfavorable “gross disproportionality” cases that have previously been 
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considered by the Court do not need to govern the claim and, therefore, 
do not foreclose the possibility that the Constitution itself prohibits 
these sentences. 
After exploring how to understand the constitutional claim in a way 
that brings the Supreme Court’s categorical approach to bear (rather 
than the gross disproportionality approach), this Article assesses the 
factors the Court considers in its consensus-based categorical test. It 
sets out, and then evaluates, the various indicators of consensus upon 
which the Court relies: the number of jurisdictions that legislatively 
authorize a punishment; the number of sentences actually imposed; and 
the degree of geographic isolation. It also evaluates the various consider-
ations that assist the Court in making an independent judgment of the 
punishment. Ultimately, based on binding Eighth Amendment pre-
cedent, sufficient evidence is available now to enable the Court to strike 
down life without parole sentences for nonviolent offenses. In other 
words, there is an emerging consensus that the Court should recognize. 
I. How It Became Possible for Someone to Be 
Sentenced to Life Without Parole  
for a Nonviolent Offense 
The 1980s and 1990s saw the United States transform into the 
world’s most carceral society,1 in large part due to the dramatic expan-
sion of state and federal government sentencing policies that imposed 
stiff mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses and crippled the 
use of parole.2 Among the millions of people that have subsequently 
been caught in the net of mass incarceration is a group of offenders 
sentenced to die in prison for nonviolent crimes. Just over 3,000 people 
are currently serving life without the possibility of parole3 sentences in 
 
1. See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (2010) (describing how 
U.S. policies, including the “War on Drugs,” increased incarceration rates). 
2. See, e.g., William J. Sabol et al., Urban Inst. Justice Policy Ctr., 
The Influences of Truth-in-Sentencing Reforms on Changes in 
States’ Sentencing Practices and Prison Populations (2002), 
http://www.urban.org/research/publication/influences-truth-sentencing-
reforms-changes-states-sentencing-practices-and-prison-populations/view/ 
full_report [http://perma.cc/8D6A-2N6X] (analyzing in-depth the effects of 
sentencing policies in various states). 
3. All references to “life sentences” within this Article refer to life sentences 
without the possibility of parole. In some jurisdictions, it is possible to 
receive a life sentence with the possibility of parole after some amount of 
time. Those types of life sentences are beyond this Article’s scope. 
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the United States for crimes that did not involve an act of violence.4 
These people are serving their sentences for property crimes, drug 
offenses, financial crimes, or public-order offenses.5 
The number of people serving life without parole sentences for 
nonviolent offenses began to climb in the late 1980s when mandatory 
minimums for drug and gun offenses gained currency and parole was 
largely abolished in the federal system.6 The vast majority of people 
serving life without parole for nonviolent offenses in 2012 were 
sentenced in the federal system: 2,074 of 3,278 nationally or sixty-three 
percent.7 
After setting out a definition of nonviolent crimes, this Part will 
detail the federal government’s implementation of harsh sentencing 
policies for drug offenders in the 1980s and '90s, which resulted in many 
nonviolent life without parole sentences, and explore the climate in 
which those laws were passed. It will also identify the small number of 
other jurisdictions that have sentenced people to life without parole for 
nonviolent offenses and the laws by which they have done so. 
This Part will also explore the recent shift away from this harsh 
sentencing regime. Legislative bodies, prominent political figures, and 
the President himself have begun to reject life without parole for 
nonviolent offenses as “an unnecessarily harsh sentence imposed in 
crueler times.”8 States are adjusting their sentencing schemes to divert 
nonviolent offenders out of prison and to place drug offenders into 
treatment.9 Legislation currently pending before Congress would elim-
inate life without parole for people convicted of nonviolent offenses.10 
The vast majority of states have abandoned the policies and practices 
that result in nonviolent life without parole sentences, and the 
remaining sentences are concentrated in just a handful of jurisdictions, 
signaling waning support for the punishment nationally. 
 
4. Jennifer Turner & Will Bunting, Am. Civil Liberties Union, A 
Living Death: Life Without Parole for Nonviolent Offenses 20 
(Vanita Gupta et al. eds., 2013). 
5. Id. at 19. 
6. See Sabol et al., supra note 2, at 9–11 (detailing sentencing law and 
prison release decision changes in select States). 
7. Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 22–23. 
8. Alli-Balogun v. United States, No. 92–CR–1108, No. 13–CV–1108, 2015 WL 
4273786 (E.D.N.Y July 15, 2015), at *1 (discussing opinion on resentencing). 
9. See infra Part I.D (examining changing attitudes toward sentencing policies). 
10. See infra Part I.D.3 (examining the pending legislation). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 2·2015 
The Emerging Eighth Amendment Consensus Against Life Without Parole 
Sentences for Nonviolent Offenses 
529 
A. Defining “Nonviolent” Offenses 
This Article relies heavily on a groundbreaking report that the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) published in November of 
2013. The report, titled “A Living Death: Life Without Parole for 
Nonviolent Offenses,” provides a thorough factual assessment of the 
issue, including what jurisdictions utilize the punishment and how 
many offenders are under the sentence.11 Although the factual inform-
ation contained in the report was compiled more than two years ago, it 
remains the most comprehensive, reliable, and accurate publicly-
available source. 
The ACLU report defines crimes as nonviolent if they “do not 
involve the use or threat of physical force against a person.”12 Along 
with obviously violent crimes such as murder, attempted murder, 
manslaughter, sexual abuse crimes, assault, and robbery, the ACLU 
includes certain weapons offenses such as unlawful discharge of a 
weapon as violent crimes.13 Moreover, though certain sex crimes, such 
as possession of child pornography, do not involve an act of violence 
against another person, the ACLU has excluded all sex crimes from the 
data it collected on the grounds that sex crimes inflict “a kind of harm 
grave enough to set them apart from other nonviolent offenses.”14 
In coming to this definition, the ACLU notes the inherent difficult-
ies involved in parsing the “unpredictable and haphazard” statutory 
and judicial classifications, some of which extend violent crime to the 
“risk of force against the person or property of another.”15 In certain 
jurisdictions, offenses such as burglary of an unoccupied dwelling or 
obstruction of justice are classified as violent crimes.16 The ACLU 
dismisses these “inconsistent and overbroad” definitions of violence, as 
do we for the purposes of this Article.17 
Critically, the ACLU report’s definition of violent crime does not 
include drug offenses. Despite the conflation of drugs and violence in 
much of the rhetoric that surrounded the promulgation of mandatory 
minimum sentences and habitual offender (three strikes) statutes in the 
1980s and 1990s,18 Americans by and large posit drug use as a public 
 
11. Turner & Bunting, supra note 4. 
12. Id. at 18. 
13. Id. at 18–19. 
14. Id. at 19. 
15. Id. at 18. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. See, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. 31, 329–30 (1986) (statement of Sen. Lawton 
Chiles) (“And so we find that people, when they are addicted, will go out 
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health problem rather than a crime problem.19 For instance, President 
Obama has recently granted clemency to one hundred and forty-one 
“nonviolent” drug offenders (including people convicted of trafficking 
offenses), whom he distinguished from “people who need to be in 
prison . . . violent criminals.”20 Part of the reason for this shift, along 
with the evident destruction of communities caused by over two decades 
of the mass incarceration of drug offenders,21 is the emergence of 
research that rebuffs the idea that drugs and violent crime are inher-
ently related.22 A recent scholarly analysis notes: 
[C]rime rates have fallen and violent crime today is at its lowest 
point since the 1970s, while incarceration rates remain historically 
high. Violence rates have remained stable, if not lowered, as drug 
use rates have increased. The empirical connection between drugs 
and violence is not strong, and at the very least is not clear.23 
 
and steal, rob, lie, cheat, take money from any savings, take refrigerators 
out of their houses, anything they can get their hands on to maintain that 
habit. That, of course, has caused crime to go up at a tremendously increased 
rate in our cities and in our States—the crimes of burglary, robbery, assault, 
purse snatching, mugging, those crimes where people are trying to feed 
that habit.”). 
19. See Julie Beck, Treating Drug Abuse as a Disease, Not a Crime, The 
Atlantic (April 2, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/ 
2014/04/treating-drug-abuse-as-a-disease-not-a-crime/360042/ [http:// 
perma.cc/M7EJ-KC6X] (reporting that when asked “In dealing with drug 
policy, should government focus more on providing treatment for people 
who use illegal drugs such as heroin and cocaine, or do you think it should 
focus more on prosecuting people who use these types of drugs?,” sixty-
seven percent responded “[p]roviding treatment” compared to twenty-six 
percent that responded “[p]rosecuting drug users”). 
20. Peter Baker, Obama, in Oklahoma, Takes Reform Message to the Prison 
Cell Block, N.Y. Times (July 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
07/17/us/obama-el-reno-oklahoma-prison.html [http://perma.cc/4WSU-
ST4V] (emphasis added); see also Sari Horwitz, President Obama Commutes 




21. See generally Alexander, supra note 1 (describing how U.S. policies, 
including the “War on Drugs,” increased incarceration rates). 
22. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
227, 227 (2015) (“[A] causal connection between drugs and violence is 
unsupported by historical arrest data, current research, or independent 
empirical evidence.”). 
23. Id. at 273 (citations omitted). 
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According to a recent report by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
self-reported crack cocaine use has continued to drop since Congress 
passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,24 which drastically reduced 
lengths of sentences for people convicted of crack cocaine offenses.25 A 
number of state legislatures have adjusted their approach to drug 
offenders accordingly, choosing to divert lower-level offenders into 
treatment programs rather than send them to prison.26 Professor 
Michael M. O’Hear offers a succinct summary of the way in which our 
thinking about drugs and violence has changed since the passage of War 
on Drugs era laws: 
The world, however, has changed since 1991. The crack epidemic 
abated and criminal violence more generally plummeted. In public 
opinion surveys, mentions of drugs as the nation’s top problem 
peaked in 1990 and then fell dramatically. Thus, while the danger-
ousness of cocaine trafficking in 1991 may have warranted the 
[Supreme] Court’s treatment of the offense as a violent one, the 
experience of the ensuing two decades may have undermined the 
factual basis of the Court’s decision. Certainly, there seems noth-
ing inherently violent about trafficking in addictive psychoactive 
substances—for example, one does not think of Starbucks, 
Anheuser-Busch, or Philip Morris as violent organizations, de-
spite what one may think about the products they peddle.27 
The next subpart describes the laws passed during the height of the 
moral panic about drugs and how those laws swept up a large portion 
of the people who are serving life without parole for nonviolent crimes 
in our prisons today. 
B. The Federal System 
Congress abolished parole through the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984,28 which meant that people convicted of an offense on or after 
November 1, 1987 would have to serve eighty-five percent of their 
sentence before becoming eligible for release, and people serving life 
 
24.  Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).  
25. United States Sentencing Comm’n, Report to the Congress: 
Impact of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 27 (2015). 
26. See generally Judith Greene & Marc Mauer, The Sentencing 
Project, Downscaling Prisons: Lessons from Four States (2010) 
(examining the policies of Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York). 
27. Michael M. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to 
Adults, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 1087, 1131 (2013) (citations omitted). 
28.  Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2040 (1984). 
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sentences would never be released.29 Though mandatory minimums 
were originally introduced by Congress in 1984 for certain drug and gun 
related offenses,30 it was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198631 that intro-
duced the scheme of mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses 
that is still in place today.32 That scheme included the 100:1 crack 
cocaine versus powder cocaine sentence disparity that was later 
redressed in part by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.33 Judge Clyde S. 
Cahill of the Eastern District of Missouri described the frenzied 
backdrop against which these laws were written: 
Images of young black men daily saturated the screens of our 
televisions. These distorted images branded onto the public mind 
and the minds of legislators that young black men were solely 
responsible for the drug crisis in America. The media created a 
stereotype of a crack dealer as a young black male, unemployed, 
gang affiliated, gun toting, and a menace to society.34 
The 1986 Act intended to target medium- and high-level drug 
traffickers and enhance sentences for repeat offenders.35 Notably, it was 
 
29. Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998). 
30. See United States Sentencing Comm’n, Special Report to the 
Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal 
Justice System 9 (1991) [hereinafter Mandatory Minimum Penalties 
1991]. These included what the U.S. Sentencing Commission describes as 
“substantial mandatory sentencing add-ons or enhancements for the use or 
carrying of a firearm during a broadly defined crime of violence.” Id. 
31. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).  
32. United States Sentencing Comm’n, Report to Congress: 
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice 
System 23 (2011) [hereinafter Mandatory Minimum Penalties 2011]. 
33. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). See Mandatory Minimum 
Penalties 2011 at 32 (“The legislative history of the ratio shows that, 
in addition to viewing the ratio as consistent with the Act’s general 
serious/major trafficker penalty structure, Congress predicated the ratio 
upon its conclusion that crack cocaine was more dangerous than powder 
cocaine because of its especially deleterious effects on the communities 
where it was becoming increasingly prevalent.”). 
34. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 783 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (citations 
omitted), rev’d, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994). 
35. Mandatory Minimum Penalties 2011, supra note 32, at 24 (“Senator 
Robert Byrd, then the Senate Minority Leader, summarized the intent behind 
the legislation: ‘For the kingpins—the masterminds who are really running 
these operations—and they can be identified by the amount of drugs with 
which they are involved—we require a jail term upon conviction. If it is their 
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constructed by Democrats in the House of Representatives seeking to 
demonstrate their law-and-order bona fides in the face of a 1984 election 
loss in which they were accused of being “soft on crime,”36 even though 
the legislation was coopted by President Regan.37 Congress hurried to 
pass the bill in response to a national hysteria about drug use (including 
crack cocaine and the death of Boston Celtics basketball star Len Bias 
from a cocaine overdose).38 A 2011 report by the United States Sent-
encing Commission noted that “Congress bypassed much of its usual 
deliberative legislative process. As a result, Congress held no committee 
hearings and produced no reports related to the 1986 Act.”39 The same 
report concluded that, in fact, contrary to Congress’s intent to target 
major and serious traffickers, in practice, “the quantity of drugs invol-
ved in an offense is not closely related to the offender’s function in the 
offense” and that “the mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses 
may apply more broadly than Congress may have originally intended.”40 
 
first conviction, the minimum term is 10 years . . . . Our proposal would also 
provide mandatory minimum penalties for the middle-level dealers as well.’”). 
36. Eric E. Sterling, Drug Laws and Snitching: A Primer, Frontline, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/snitch/primer/ 
[http://perma.cc/VYR8-CDWG] (“During the July 4 congressional recess, 
[House Speaker “Tip”] O’Neill’s constituents were so consumed with anger 
and dismay about Bias’ death, O’Neill realized how powerful an anti-drug 
campaign would be.”). 
37. Andrew B. Whitford & Jeff Yates, Presidential Rhetoric and the 
Public Agenda 61 (1st ed. 2009) (stating that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986 created differential mandatory minimums for crack and powder cocaine). 
38. Jonathan Easley, The Day the Drug War Really Started, Salon (June 19, 
2011), http://www.salon.com/2011/06/19/len_bias_cocaine_tragedy_ 
still_affecting_us_drug_law/ [http://perma.cc/2LLB-SSDG] (describing 
how Eric Sterling, former counsel to the House committee that drafted the 
1986 Act, recently discussed the central role that Bias’s death played in the 
passage of the law and the national discussion around it, saying: “Suddenly, 
the Len Bias case was the driving force behind every piece of legislation. 
Members of Congress were setting up hearings about the drug problem and 
every subcommittee chairman was looking to get a piece of the action. They 
were talking about Len Bias at every press conference and it was all tied 
together—the Len Bias tragedy and the potency of drugs and this evil that 
was killing America’s youth. He became shorthand, a high-profile symbol 
for all of these issues. People were shouting about how crack cocaine was 
the most addictive or dangerous substance to ever exist, and one lawmaker 
was calling for the death penalty for some drug-related offenses. It was 
hyperbole piled on top of exaggeration.”). 
39. Mandatory Minimum Penalties 2011, supra note 32, at 23–24. 
40. Id. at 168–69. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 2·2015 
The Emerging Eighth Amendment Consensus Against Life Without Parole 
Sentences for Nonviolent Offenses 
534 
That the bill created immediate, far-reaching, and drastic changes 
to the nation’s relationship with drugs is underscored by the unprece-
dented number of mandatory minimums it promulgated.41 The U.S. 
Sentencing Commission reported that “[t]oday there are approximately 
[one hundred] separate federal mandatory minimum penalty provisions 
located in [sixty] different criminal statutes.”42 
Historically, mandatory minimums were used for offenses concern-
ing treason, murder, piracy, rape, slave trafficking, internal revenue 
collection, and counterfeiting.43 In the 1950s, Congress introduced rela-
tively short mandatory minimums for certain drug crimes for the first 
time. However, these were all but abolished in the following decade 
under President Nixon.44 Nevertheless, the trend towards mandatory 
minimums for drug crimes had been established and quickly resurfaced 
in the following decade. These mandatory minimums are undergirded 
by a belief that drugs and crime are inextricably linked: “The assump-
tion that drugs cause violence is at the core of American drug policy 
and helps explain why drug convictions increased almost tenfold from 
1980 to 1996.”45 
The U.S. government first introduced life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole as a possible sentence for certain federal drug 
offenses in the 1986 Act and broadened life without parole sentences 
through amendments in 1988 that made penalties for drug conspiracy 
the same as those applied to substantive distribution and importation/ 
exportation offenses.46 According to the Narcotics Penalties and Enfor-
cement Act of 1986,47 a person who is convicted under the statute and 
has one or more prior drug felony convictions will be sentenced to a 
minimum of twenty years and a maximum of life imprisonment.48 An 
amendment to the Act in 1988 provided that offenders convicted under 
the statute who were also previously convicted of two or more prior 
drug felonies are subject to a mandatory minimum term of life imprison-
ment.49 
 
41. Id. at 23. 
42. Mandatory Minimum Penalties 1991, supra note 30, at 11. 
43. Mandatory Minimum Penalties 2011, supra note 32, at 22. 
44. Id. 
45. Baradaran, supra note 22, at 229–30 (citation omitted). 
46. Mandatory Minimum Penalties 2011, supra note 32, at 25. 
47.  Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
48. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
49. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). 
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It was under this Act that the bulk of federal prisoners serving life 
without parole for nonviolent offenses were sentenced.50 Ninety-six 
percent of federal prisoners serving life without parole for nonviolent 
crimes in the U.S. are drug offenders.51 
The trend toward long, punitive sentences for nonviolent offenders 
in the federal system continued under President Bill Clinton. In 1994, 
Clinton’s Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act52 conflated 
drug trafficking offenses with violent crime in a provision that man-
dated life imprisonment for “violent felons” with three or more serious 
felony convictions, even though these “serious felony convictions” might 
include nonviolent drug trafficking offenses.53 In 1998, Congress amend-
ed 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to make it possible for people convicted of possess-
ing or brandishing certain firearms during the commission of a drug 
trafficking offense to receive mandatory life without parole sentences if 
the offense is a second or subsequent offense under the statute.54 A 
significant portion of people serving nonviolent life without parole were 
sentenced under this federal statute. According to data from the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission on the prisoners admitted to serve life sentences 
in federal prisons between 1999 and 2011, 588 were sentenced for a 
nonviolent firearms offense.55 
As a result of these and other provisions56 that were passed in the 
1980’s and 1990’s, the ACLU estimates that as much as 85 percent of 
 
50. See Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 25 (noting that more than a 
quarter of federal prisoners serving life without parole for nonviolent 
crimes were sentenced as “career offenders,” mostly for drug offenses). 
51. Id. 
52.  Pub. L. No. 103–322, tit. 7, § 70001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1982–1984 (1994).  
53. Id. The bill also encouraged states to adopt three strikes laws—ostensibly 
for violent felons—and “truth-in-sentencing” laws that required the 
abolition of parole for violent offenses. However, most states had already 
adopted such laws or didn’t consider the federal legislation a significant 
factor in subsequently doing so. See Katherine J. Rosich & Kamala Mallik 
Kane, Truth in Sentencing and State Sentencing Practices, Nat’l Inst. 
Justice J., No. 252, http://www.nij.gov/journals/252/pages/sentencing. 
aspx [http://perma.cc/82EZ-VK58]. 
54. Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–386, 112 Stat. 3469. 
55. Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 25. 
56. Other examples of mandatory life without parole sentences for nonviolent drug 
offenses under federal statute include: third or subsequent conviction for 
manufacture or sale of, e.g., 50 grams or more of methamphetamine or 280 
grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012); second or 
subsequent conviction for manufacture, sale, etc. of, e.g., 50 grams or more of 
methamphetamine or 1,000 kilograms or more “of a mixture or substance 
containing a detectable amount of marihuana,” Id.; third or subsequent 
conviction for manufacture, sale, etc. of any amount of a controlled substance 
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the federal prison population that was sentenced to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole between 1999 and 2011 were convicted 
of non-violent offenses.57 
The majority of people serving life without parole for nonviolent 
offenses in both state and federal systems have been sentenced under 
the sorts of mandatory provisions that took root during this period: 
mandatory minimums, habitual offender laws, and penalty enhance-
ments, such as gun enhancements.58 Unsurprisingly, jurisdictions that 
have abolished parole while retaining life sentences for people convicted 
of nonviolent offenses—primarily the federal system, Louisiana, and 
Oklahoma—incarcerate the largest numbers of these offenders.59 
C. States That Sentence Individuals to Life Without the  
Possibility of Parole for Nonviolent Offenses 
Louisiana and Oklahoma have closely mirrored the federal system 
regarding which type of nonviolent offenses they tend to punish with 
life without parole sentences. Nonviolent drug offenders make up one 
hundred percent of nonviolent prisoners serving life without parole in 
Oklahoma and eighty percent of nonviolent lifers in Louisiana.60 Like 
the federal government, both states give mandatory life without parole 
sentences to people convicted of certain drug offenses for a third time.61 
 
to a minor within 1,000 feet of an elementary, vocational, or secondary school 
or college, junior college, or university; or playground, or public housing 
facility; or within one hundred feet of a youth center, public swimming pool, 
or video arcade facility, 21 U.S.C. §§ 860, 841(b)(1)(A) (2012); third or 
subsequent conviction for sale or possession any amount of a controlled 
substance in or within 1,000 feet of a truck stop or rest area, 21 U.S.C. §§ 849, 
841(b)(1)(A) (2012); third or subsequent conviction for distribution by a 
person eighteen or older of any controlled substance to a person under twenty-
one years of age, 21 U.S.C. §§ 859, 841(b)(1)(A) (2012); third or subsequent 
conviction of adult who hires, persuades, etc. any minor to participate or assist 
in any drug offense or receives any controlled substance from a minor other 
than an immediate family member, 21 U.S.C. §§ 861, 841(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
57. Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 24. 
58. See id. at 39 (explaining mandatory minimum sentencing rules that 
control life without parole sentences). 
59. See id. at 37 (describing jurisdictions that retained life without parole 
sentences for nonviolent offenders after the jurisdiction abolished parole). 
60. See id. at 23 (classifying nonviolent life without parole prisoners). 
61. See La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) (2015). Mandatory life sentences 
will be imposed for a third or subsequent conviction for any drug offense 
punishable by 10 years or more. Qualifying offenses include simple possession 
of any amount of any Schedule I substance or a 3rd or subsequent conviction 
for simple possession of any amount of marijuana, or manufacture or sale of 
any amount of any Schedule I or II substance. See also Okla. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 63 § 2-415(D)(3) (West 2015). Mandatory life sentences will be imposed 
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Both states are among the highest users of nonviolent life without 
parole sentences, and their statutes make clear why. Louisiana, which, 
behind the federal government, holds the second highest number of 
people serving nonviolent life without parole at four hundred and 
twenty-nine sentences, mandates these sentences for a third or sub-
sequent conviction for simple possession of any amount of marijuana 
and offenses as minor as purse-snatching.62 Other states that provide 
for mandatory minimums of life without parole for repeat nonviolent 
drug offenders include Alabama, Georgia, and Illinois.63 Additionally, 
Oklahoma allows discretionary life without parole sentences to be 
imposed for some first-time nonviolent drug offenders.64 
Notably, neither Florida nor Mississippi provide for mandatory life 
without parole sentences for repeat drug offenses (though they do allow 
them as a discretionary matter). Both states—along with Alabama65—
mandate life without parole sentences for certain nonviolent first-time 
drug offenders.66 In Mississippi, a person convicted of possession with 
intent to sell two ounces of heroin would receive a mandatory sentence 
of life without parole, even if that person had no prior criminal history.67 
The other two states that use nonviolent life without parole 
sentences with regularity emphasize property crimes over drug offenses. 
Alabama has 171 prisoners serving life without parole for nonviolent 
 
for a third or subsequent conviction for manufacture, sale, etc. of, e.g., 25 
pounds or more of marijuana or 10 grams or more of heroin. 
62. See State v. Lindsey, 770 So. 2d 339, 347–48 (La. 2000) (Johnson, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the defendant’s sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole for purse-snatching was constitutionally excessive and 
grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment). For further 
examples of offenses for which Louisiana mandates life without parole for 
repeat offenders, see La. Stat. Ann. §§ 15:529.1(A)(3)(b), 14:65.1, 14:62, 
14:66 (2015) (detailing offenses for which Louisiana mandates life without 
parole for repeat offenders). 
63. Caitlyn Lee Hall, Note, Good Intentions: A National Survey of Life 
Sentences for Nonviolent Offenses, 16 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 
1101, 1212–13 (2013). 
64. See id. at 1124 (citing Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63 § 2-509(D) (West 2015)) 
(allowing for discretionary life without parole sentences for converting 
marijuana to hashish). 
65. See Ala. Code § 13A-12-231(1)(d), (2)(d) (2014) (stating that manufacture, 
sale, etc. of 10 kilograms or more of cocaine or 1,000 pounds or more of 
cannabis results in mandatory life without parole sentence). 
66. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 893.135(1)(b)(2), (1)(b)(3), (1)(c)(2), (1)(c)(3) (West 
2015); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139(f) (2015). 
67. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139(f) (2015). 
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property offenses compared to 49 for nonviolent drug offenses.68 
Likewise, Florida has 203 people serving life without parole for non-
violent property offenses and just 45 for nonviolent drug offenses.69 
Nonviolent property offenses, which can trigger a life without parole 
sentence under Florida’s habitual offender law, include unarmed bur-
glary and simple arson.70 
The ACLU concludes that “Louisiana, Florida, Alabama, Mississ-
ippi, and South Carolina are among the states with the highest numbers 
of prisoners serving LWOP for nonviolent crimes nationwide, largely 
because of these states’ harsh habitual offender laws that mandate 
LWOP sentences for repeat offenders.”71 
As with the federal crime policies discussed above, these state laws 
were largely passed in the 1980s and 1990s in response to a public 
sentiment that indeterminate sentencing and parole schemes were 
unfair and ineffective.72 Harsh mandatory minimums for nonviolent 
offenders first took root in the 1970s with New York’s “Rockefeller 
Laws.”73 Seeking to score political points for an upcoming presidential 
bid, Nelson Rockefeller, the governor of New York, decided to get 
“tough on crime” just nineteen months before leaving his post for the 
White House. In his State of the State address on January 3, 1973, 
Rockefeller demanded that “every illegal-drug dealer be punished with 
a mandatory prison sentence of life without parole,” shepherding in new 
drug laws soon after.74 Most life without parole sentences for nonviolent 
offenders in the states, however, are the result of laws that were passed 
two decades later amid growing concerns about crime nationally.75 In 
part, this was due to the “back-end” modification of abolishing parole 
in certain states.76 During the mid-1990s, public opinion polls con-
sistently reported crime as the most important problem facing the 
 
68. Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 23. 
69. Id. 
70. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.084(1)(d), (4)(d) (West 2012). 
71. Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 25. 
72. See Sabol et al., supra note 2, at 9 (discussing changes in sentencing reforms). 
73. Mandatory Minimum Penalties 1991, supra note 30, at 95 n.501. 
74. Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, The Atlantic (Dec. 1998), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/the-prison- 
industrial-complex/304669/ [http://perma.cc/9NFH-6CNL]. 
75. See Hall, supra note 63, at 1159 (listing jurisdictions that have statutes 
with possible life without parole sentences and classifying those statutes 
based on whether LWOP is mandatory).  
76. For example, in 1994, Florida’s legislature enacted a bill that meant persons 
receiving a life sentence for crimes committed on or after October 1, 1995 
would no longer be eligible for parole. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 2·2015 
The Emerging Eighth Amendment Consensus Against Life Without Parole 
Sentences for Nonviolent Offenses 
539 
nation.77 A 2011 study by the Urban Institute notes the rapid expansion 
of truth-in-sentencing laws during this period.78 Forty-two states had 
implemented some form of truth-in-sentencing laws by 1999,79 and 
many had adopted sentencing policies that included a mix of mandatory 
minimum penalties, habitual offender laws, and increased sentencing 
severity for nonviolent offenses.80 As discussed above, each of these 
policies contributed to an uptick in life sentences for people convicted 
of nonviolent crimes.81 
Though support for mandatory minimum penalties flourished in the 
states at the same time as the federal government was enacting stiff 
penalties for drug and other nonviolent offenses, nonviolent life without 
parole sentences have remained geographically concentrated in just a 
handful of jurisdictions.82 Today, according to the ACLU, only the 
federal government, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Oklahoma, and South Carolina have prisoners serving non-
violent LWOP.83 Missouri was included in the ACLU’s report because 
one person was serving life without parole for a nonviolent crime there; 





Institute of Corrections, State Legislative Actions on Truth in 
Sentencing: A Review of Law and Legislation in the Context of 
the Violent Crime Control Law Enforcement Act of 1994 53. 
77. Sarah Sun Beale, Still Tough On Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice 
in the United States, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 413, 417 (2003). 
78. Sabol et al., supra note 2, at 9. 
79. Id. at 7. 
80. Id. at 9. 
81. See Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 20–21 (“A sentence to life without 
parole, . . . means the prisoner has no prospect for release . . . regardless 
of . . . efforts of rehabilitation: virtually every person sentenced to LWOP 
dies in prison.”). 
82. See, e.g., Mandatory Minimum Penalties 1991, supra note 30, at 9 
(“While the trend toward mandatory minimums in the states was gradual, 
by 1983, 49 of the 50 states had passed such provisions.”). 
83. See Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 22. The Departments of 
Corrections of Delaware, Virginia, and Nevada did not provide data 
requested by the ACLU so the number of people serving nonviolent life 
without parole in these three states, if any, is unknown. Id. 
84. Steven Nelson, Man Doomed to Prison Death for Pot Being Released, 
U.S. News (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/ 
08/11/man-doomed-to-prison-death-for-pot-being-released [http://perma.cc/ 
V7Y8-B4WA].  
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Chart 1. Use of Nonviolent Life Without Parole in the United States85 
D. The Current Swing Against Nonviolent Life  
Without Parole Sentences 
As discussed above, the widespread implementation of mandatory 
minimums and habitual offender laws has led to a well-documented 
crisis in federal and state prisons with unprecedented overcrowding and 
rapidly aging prison populations.86 Former overseers of these policies, 
including former president Bill Clinton, members of Congress from both 
sides of the aisle, and the current President, are now turning against 
such policies and calling for redress. Both promises of executive clem-
ency and proposed federal legislation have the potential to significantly 
reduce the size of the federal nonviolent life without parole population 
but only if significant hurdles can be overcome. 
1. Changing Attitudes 
Many of the key architects of the 1980s and 1990s tough-on-crime 
laws have since come to reject them as “overly broad” and “overdone”—
 
85. Jennifer Turner & Will Bunting, Am. Civ. Liberties Union, A 
Living Death: Life Without Parole for Nonviolent Offenses 23 
(Vanita Gupta et al. eds., 2013). This figure does not reflect the growing 
number of commutations by President Obama of federal prisoners serving 
nonviolent life without parole, which totaled sixty-nine at the time of writing. 
86. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson & H. Darr Beiser, Aging Prisoners’ Costs Put Systems 
Nationwide in a Bind, USA Today (July 11, 2013), http://www.usatoday. 
com/story/news/nation/2013/07/10/cost-care-aging-prisoners/2479285/ 
[http://perma.cc/5GVS-XT8C] (explaining unexpected governmental cost 
increases for aging prisoners).  
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particularly with respect to nonviolent offenders.87 As early as 2000, 
when he was nearing the end of his presidency, Bill Clinton acknow-
ledged that the laws of the previous two decades had swept up far too 
many people convicted of nonviolent crimes. He told Rolling Stone 
magazine that “[w]e really need a reexamination of our entire policy on 
imprisonment. . . . There are tons of people in prison who are non-
violent offenders—who have drug-related charges that are directly 
related to their own drug problems.”88 In that same interview, Clinton 
said that possession of small amounts of marijuana should be decrim-
inalized, that nonviolent offenders are serving sentences that are too 
long in many cases, and that mandatory minimums need to be reexam-
ined. Clinton told the magazine, “I don’t believe, by and large, in perm-
anent lifetime penalties.”89 Around the same time, public support for 
alternative sentences for nonviolent offenders, particularly drug offend-
ers, was shown to have increased, and support for mandatory sentences 
had decreased since the 1990s.90 
During a 2007 Democratic Primary Debate, presidential hopeful 
Hillary Clinton, who in 1994 had touted the virtues of three strikes 
laws,91 similarly singled out nonviolent offenders as being held captive 
by a prison system that was supposed to target violent criminals: “We 
need diversion, like drug courts. Nonviolent offenders should not be 
serving hard time in our prisons. They need to be diverted from our 
prison system.”92 In the same speech, she noted that mandatory min-
imums have been too widely used, beyond the certain violent crimes for 
 
87. Ed Pilkington, Bill Clinton: Mass Incarceration on My Watch ‘Put 
Too Many People in Prison,’ The Guardian (April 28, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/28/bill-clinton-calls-for-
end-mass-incarceration [http://perma.cc/68RG-TWDV]. 
88. Jann S. Wenner, Bill Clinton: The Rolling Stone Interview, Rolling Stone 




90. Beale, supra note 77, at 423. 
91. In a 1994 speech at the Annual Women in Policing Conference, First Lady 
Hilary Clinton espoused the virtues of her husband’s crime bill which would 
deliver stiff penalties to repeat offenders: “[W]e need more and tougher 
prison sentences for repeat offenders. The three strikes and you’re out for 
violent offenders has to be part of the plan. We need more prisons to keep 
violent offenders for as long as it takes to keep them off the streets.”  
Hilary Clinton on Crime, On the Issues, http://www.issues2000.org/ 
Domestic/Hillary_Clinton_Crime.htm [http://perma.cc/R57N-2FLR] 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
92. Id. 
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which they were needed.93 Indeed, more than ninety percent of indivi-
duals interviewed in the ACLU’s 2013 study regarding people sentenced 
to die in prison for nonviolent offenses were given mandatory life with-
out parole sentences. 
Former President Clinton now says that part of the problem is that 
crime laws of his era were “overly broad instead of appropriately 
tailored,” catching too many people in the net and keeping them entan-
gled for too long.94 Clinton would later liken the federal government’s 
passage of his 1994 bill as taking a “shotgun to a problem that needed 
a .22.”95 Addressing a group of seventy mayors and law enforcement 
officials in 2014, Clinton said, “We . . . just sent everybody to jail for 
too long.”96 Again, not only did he recognize this to be true of the federal 
system but also of state laws influenced by the trend at the time: “In 
that [1994] bill, there were longer sentences, and most of these people 
are in prison under state law, but the federal law set a trend. And that 
was overdone; we were wrong about that.”97 
An extraordinary range of political voices have called for significant 
reform of harsh mandatory minimums, including presidential hopefuls 
Ted Cruz, Chris Christie, and Hillary Clinton, as well as former Speaker 
of the House, John Boehner.98 There is a broad recognition among law-
makers that the punitive drug sentences aimed at deterring serious drug 
traffickers have instead led to the incarceration of mostly low-level drug 
addicts.99 This is in part because judges and corrections officials have 
 
93. Id. 
94. Pilkington, supra note 87. 
95. Kasie Hunt, Bill Clinton: Prison Sentences to Take Center Stage in 2016, 
MSNBC (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/bill-clinton-
prison-sentences-take-center-stage-2016 [http://perma.cc/C73J-TR6J]. 
96. Id. 
97. Jacob Sullum, Boehner Endorses Sentencing Reform; Bill Clinton 
Apologizes for His Role in Mass Incarceration, Hit & Run Blog (July 
17, 2015, 10:32 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2015/07/17/boehner-endorses- 
sentencing-reform-bill [http://perma.cc/455H-TDDM]. 
98. In a recent book of essays published by The Brennan Center, a number 
of presidential candidates suggested policy solutions to the problem of 
mass incarceration. See generally Joseph R. Biden, Jr. et al., 
Solutions: American Leaders Speak Out on Criminal Justice 
(Inimai Chettiar & Michael Waldman eds., 2nd ed. 2015). Then-House 
Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) recently said during a weekly news 
briefing that “[w]e’ve got a lot of people in prison, frankly, who really, in 
my view, really don’t need to be there. It’s expensive to house prisoners. 
Sometimes, frankly, some of these people are there for what I’ll call flimsy 
reasons.” Sullum, supra note 97. 
99. A 2013 report by the US Sentencing Commission demonstrates that many 
people convicted under federal drug legislation were first-time offenders and 
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long been telling them so.100 In a 2012 editorial in The Nation, federal 
district judge Mark W. Bennett wrote that after nineteen years on the 
bench, he had sent more than a thousand people to federal prison for 
mandatory minimum sentences that included life without the possibility 
of release and yet could count on one hand the number of those people 
that were high-level drug traffickers.101 In a 2003 address to the 
American Bar Association, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy 
echoed these concerns, saying “I can accept neither the necessity nor 
the wisdom of federal mandatory minimum sentences. In too many 
cases, mandatory minimum sentences are unwise and unjust.”102 The 
qualms of these and other judges are supported by the findings of the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, which has consistently found that the 
federal laws are mostly applied to lower-level and first-time offenders.103 
A 2013 report by the Congressional Research Service found that only 
twenty percent of federal prisoners convicted of drug offenses were 
charged with high-level trafficking offenses.104 
Against the backdrop of this swelling call for reform, President 
Barack Obama announced that he would be granting clemency to 
certain nonviolent offenders who were serving unjust sentences. 
2. Executive Action 
With his second term nearing an end, President Obama announced 
a plan to grant clemency to nonviolent offenders on a significant scale. 
The President’s use of his clemency power—which so far has resulted 
 
served sentences for relatively minor offenses. United States Sentencing 
Comm’n, Quick Facts: Drug Trafficking Offenses (2013). 
100. See, e.g., Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 7 (according to Burl Cain, 
the warden of Louisiana State Penitentiary, “[t]here’s an answer to this 
without being so extreme. But we’re still living-20-years-ago extreme. Throw 
the human away. He’s worthless. Boom: up the river. And yet, he didn’t even 
kill anybody. He didn’t do anything, but he just had an addiction he couldn’t 
control and he was trying to support it robbing. That’s terrible to rob 
people—I’ve been robbed, I hate it. I want something done to him. But not 
all his life. That’s extreme. That’s cruel and unusual punishment to me.”). 
101. Judge Mark W. Bennett, How Mandatory Minimums Forced Me to Send 
More Than 1,000 Nonviolent Drug Offenders to Federal Prison, The  
Nation (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/how-mandatory-
minimums-forced-me-send-more-1000-nonviolent-drug-offenders-federal-pri/ 
[http://perma.cc/R5RG-382M]. 
102. Am. Bar Assoc., Justice Kennedy Commission: Reports with 
Recommendations to the ABA House of Delegates 4 (2004). 
103. Mandatory Minimum Penalties 2011, supra note 32, at 168–69. 
104. Lisa Sacco & Kristin Finklea, Cong. Research Serv., R43164, 
State Marijuana Legalization Initiatives: Implications for 
Federal Law Enforcement 13 (2014). 
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in eighty-nine sentence reductions and is expected to result in hundreds 
more105—is the most forceful rejection of extreme sentences for non-
violent offenders delivered by a president since the era of mass incarcer-
ation began in the 1970s.106 Announcing the commutations of forty-six 
sentences in a single day in July, 2015, President Obama noted how 
outdated the sentences for nonviolent offenses were: “Their punish-
ments didn’t fit the crime, and if they had been sentenced under today’s 
laws, nearly all of them would have already served their time.”107 Speak-
ing specifically to prisoners whose sentences denied them an opportun-
ity to demonstrate that they had changed over time, such as people 
serving nonviolent life without parole, the President added, “I believe 
that at its heart America is a nation of second chances. And I believe 
these folks deserve their second chance.”108 To date, President Obama 
has commuted sixty-nine life sentences for nonviolent offenders109 
The White House has also called on Congress to implement much-
needed reforms to address what it considers an outsized problem. After 
the last round of commutations, tens of thousands of federal prisoners 
had petitioned for clemency via the process110 initiated by Deputy 
 
105. Sari Horwitz & Juliet Eilperin, Obama Commutes Sentences of 46 




106. Peter Baker, Obama Plans Broader Use of Clemency to Free Nonviolent 
Drug Offenders, N.Y. Times (July 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
07/04/us/obama-plans-broader-use-of-clemency-to-free-nonviolent-drug-
offenders.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/957T-CVEL] (“But even as he 
exercises authority more assertively than any of his modern predecessors, 
Mr. Obama has only begun to tackle the problem he has identified.”). 
107. Neil Eggleston, President Obama Announces 46 Commutations in Video 
Address: “America Is a Nation of Second Chances,” The White House 




109. Commutations Granted by President Barack Obama (2009–2015), U.S.  
Dep’t of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/obama-commutations 
[https://perma.cc/5DZ8-X58M]. 
110. According to the Clemency Project 2014 website, Deputy Attorney General 
James Cole asked the legal profession to provide pro bono assistance to 
federal prisoners who would likely have received a shorter sentence if they 
had been sentenced today. Clemency Project 2014 members collaborate to 
recruit and train attorneys on how to screen for prisoners who meet the 
stated criteria and assist prisoners who meet the criteria to find lawyers to 
represent them to file their clemency petitions. Clemency Project 2014, 
https://www.clemencyproject2014.org/ [https://perma.cc/ZF7Q-VQUP]. 
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Attorney General James Cole. White House press secretary Josh Earn-
est said that this demonstrates “how important it is for Congress to 
take action, that congressional action in this case could be much 
broader in terms of delivering the kind of justice and implementing the 
kind of reforms the president believes is long overdue.”111 
3. Federal Legislation 
Congress has responded to the White House’s call to redress the 
sweeping and inflexible nature of crime legislation that it passed under 
Reagan and Clinton, particularly in respect of nonviolent offenders. 
Two significant reform bills introduced into Congress would bring wide-
spread change.112 
The first was introduced by a bipartisan group of lawmakers in 
February 2015 and would eliminate life with parole sentences for drug 
offenders altogether.113 The Smarter Sentencing Act would prospect-
ively reduce life without parole sentences to twenty-five years (Senate 
version) or twenty years (House version). In addition, the bill would 
make the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively applicable, reduce mand-
atory minimums for nonviolent drug offenders, and extend the ability 
of federal judges to depart from mandatory minimums in certain cases. 
Senators Richard Durbin (D-IL) (the second-ranking Democrat) and 
Mike Lee (R-UT) are sponsoring the bill in the Senate and Represent-
atives Raul Labrador (R-ID) and Bobby Scott (D-VA) are doing like-
wise in the House of Representatives. The legislation has an impressive 
list of cosponsors: four Republicans that include Rand Paul (R-Ky.) 
and Ted Cruz (R-Texas), both presidential candidates for the 2016 
GOP nomination and an additional six Democrats. However, it may  
111. Horwitz & Eilperin, supra note 105. 
112. In addition, in 2010, Congress finally reduced the crack cocaine sentencing 
disparity that had resulted in African Americans serving, on average, nearly 
as much time in prison for nonviolent drug offenses as whites spent in prison 
for violent offenses. Though the legislation received near unanimous support, 
the Fair Sentencing Act (2010) took more than a decade to pass through 
Congress, and even then, it was not retroactive. Fair Sentencing Act, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/node/17576 [http://perma.cc/J7VL-Y58V] (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2015). The bill did, however, reduce the sentencing gap between 
offenses for crack and powder cocaine dramatically, from 100:1 to 18:1. A year 
later, the U.S. Sentencing Commission voted to retroactively apply the Fair 
Sentencing Act Guidelines to individuals sentenced before the law was enacted, 
allowing individual prisoners to petition for a sentence review and possible 
reduction in federal courts. The application of the amendment was limited to 
offenders whose sentences were not controlled by mandatory minimums or the 
three-strikes law, which includes nonviolent offenders serving life sentences. Id.  
113. Lydia Wheeler, Bipartisan Bill Would Ease Drug Sentences, The  
Hill (Feb. 12, 2015), http://thehill.com/regulation/232670-bill-targets-prison-
population-through-non-violent-drug-crimes [http://perma.cc/CWG8-2RW5]. 
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not get very far if the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), continues to stand in its way. Given 
Grassley’s adamant support for the current federal mandatory min-
imums prescribed for drug crimes, the bill’s success does not seem likely. 
Notably, Grassley is now working on his own criminal justice reform 
proposal in part because even his constituents have begun to demand 
action.114 
The sandbagging of the Smarter Sentencing Act has not stymied a 
push for imminent criminal justice reform legislation in Congress in part 
because the President’s clemency announcements keep pushing the 
momentum forward. Recognizing that Obama’s commutation project is 
not a substitute for legislation,115 Rep. Robert C. “Bobby” Scott (D-
Va.) and Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-Wis.) introduced the 
SAFE Justice Act—a piece of legislation that would go even further 
than the Smarter Sentencing Act by strengthening probation programs, 
offering more protections for poor defendants, and making it easier for 
elderly inmates to secure early release.116 The bill would also reduce the 
mandatory minimum life sentences for a third felony drug offense or a 
second drug offense that results in death or serious bodily injury to a 
mandatory minimum term of thirty-five years.117 Unlike the change to 
life sentences in the Smarter Sentencing Act, this provision in the bill 
would be retroactive if it becomes law. 
The SAFE Justice Act has widespread support in Congress, with 
nearly forty cosponsors in the House. The current Speaker of the House, 
Paul Ryan, has also been a proponent of reducing mandatory min-
imums.118  
 
114. Isaac Stanley-Becker, Senator Holds Key to Sentencing Changes, Wall 
St. J. (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/senator-holds-key-to-
sentencing-changes-1438767000 [http://perma.cc/XK53-LRWP] (“Home 
on a recent weekend, Mr. Grassley faced questions about criminal justice 
at two town meetings—a surprise, he said, as it marked the first time this 
year constituents had raised the topic.”). 
115. Horwitz & Eilperin, supra note 105. 
116. Russell Berman, The Moment for Criminal-Justice Reform?, The 
Atlantic (July 10, 2015), www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/ 
congress-obama-criminal-justice-reform/398045/ [http://perma.cc/T8SZ-
XRN2]. 
117. Sensenbrenner-Scott SAFE Justice Reinvestment Act, H.R. 2944, 114th 
Cong. § 412(e) (2015). 
118. David Gagan, Paul Ryan Could Take the Easy Road on Criminal Justice 
Reform. He Shouldn’t, Huffington Post (Jan. 12, 2016) http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/david-dagan/paul-ryan-easy-road-criminal-justice_b_ 
8962592.html [https://perma.cc/Z7UW-5FU8] (“The Speaker himself has 
previously co-sponsored a sweeping proposal to cut drug-related mandatory 
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As with the Smarter Sentencing Act, however, there is a well-
founded fear that individuals set against the legislation will kill it.119 
The length of time it took for Congress to reform the crack versus 
powder cocaine sentencing disparity even after there was widespread 
support to do so cautions against optimism.120 
4. State Legislation 
Since 1998 there has been a slow but steady rollback of mandatory 
minimum laws, particularly for nonviolent offenders. Families Against 
Mandatory Minimums provides a comprehensive list of states that have 
reformed mandatory minimum penalties, some of which allowed red-
uced sentences for thousands of people at a time.121 Michigan began the 
trend in 1998 when it repealed mandatory life without parole sentences 
for certain drug offenses and applied the law retroactively.122 It followed 
up with further repeals of mandatory minimums for drug offenses in 
2003 and 2010.123 In 2012, California voters overwhelmingly supported 
a proposition to amend the state’s “three strikes” mandatory minimum 
law so that its application was restricted to serious or violent felonies.124 
The law had previously mandated a life sentence for any third offense, 
even if it was minor and nonviolent.125 Georgia lawmakers passed a bill 
that extends parole eligibility to certain nonviolent drug offenders who 
are sentenced to a term of at least twelve years up to a life sentence 
who were not previously eligible for parole consideration.126 Even 
Louisiana, which continues to imprison the largest portion of people 
serving nonviolent life sentences among the states, passed a law in 2012 
to provide prosecutors with the ability to waive mandatory minimums 
in the case of nonviolent offenses.127 
 
minimum sentences in half, and he included criminal-justice reforms in his 
2014 anti-poverty plan.”). 
119. See Berman, supra note 116 (noting that congressional Republicans have 
been “resistant to the issue in the past”). 
120. Mandatory Minimum Penalties 2011, supra note 32, at 29–30. 
121. Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Recent State-Level 
Reforms to Mandatory Minimum Laws 1 (2013). 
122. Id. at 3. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 1. 
125. Id. 
126. H.B. 328, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). 
127. See Families Against Mandatory Minimums, supra note 121, at 2 
(describing Louisiana prison reforms). 
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More broadly, many states are looking for ways to transform their 
expensive and punitive sentencing schemes so that they encourage 
diversion and rehabilitation. For example, twenty-seven have signed up 
for the U.S. Department of Justice’s “Justice Reinvestment Initiative” 
to date.128 South Carolina, one of the program’s “success stories,” has 
reduced the portion of its prison population that were low-level, non-
violent offenders to thirty-seven percent where it had previously made 
up more than half.129 Current and former state governors are now reg-
ularly touting the importance of directing nonviolent offenders out of 
the system.130 
The broader sentencing schemes which gave rise to the regular use 
of nonviolent life without parole have steadily fallen out of favor. As a 
growing number of jurisdictions turn away from habitual offender laws 
and mandatory minimum penalties, life without parole sentences for 
nonviolent offenders are increasingly concentrated in just a handful of 
states and the federal system. In a new era of “smart” rather than 
“tough” justice, these sentences appear increasingly extreme and out-
dated. 
II. Choosing the Appropriate Eighth Amendment 
Doctrine: the Gross Disproportionality  
Approach or the Categorical Approach? 
What legal recourse do offenders serving life without parole 
sentences have available to challenge the harshness of their punish-
ment? In terms of available constitutional claims, it is the Eighth 
Amendment that protects individuals against cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted by the government. Before looking at how offenders can 
lodge the optimal constitutional challenge to the practice of sentencing 
individuals convicted of nonviolent offenses to life without parole, this 
Article identifies the two different doctrinal approaches that the Sup-
reme Court has used to evaluate claims that a defendant’s punishment  
128. Justice Reinvestment Initiative, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
https://www.bja.gov/programs/justicereinvestment/index.html [http:// 
perma.cc/6YS6-ZY6W] (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).  
129. Success Stories, Bureau of Justice Assistance, https://www.bja.gov/ 
programs/justicereinvestment/success_stories.html [http://perma.cc/697D- 
RF97] (last visited Oct. 13, 2015). 
130. E.g., Mike Huckabee, Treat Drug Addiction and Address Character, in 
Solutions: American Leaders Speak Out on Criminal Justice 43–
47 (Inimai Chettiar & Michael Waldman eds., 2015) (writing as the former 
Governor of Arkansas); see also Chris Christie, Save Jail for the 
Dangerous, in Solutions: American Leaders Speak Out on Criminal 
Justice 19–23 (Inimai Chettiar & Michael Waldman eds., 2015) (writing 
as the Governor of New Jersey). 
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is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. It then explains how 
and why one approach better accounts for the emerging developments 
that indicate that the practice may be falling out of favor. 
One doctrinal approach, the “gross disproportionality” approach, 
traditionally describes Court’s analysis of Eighth Amendment senten-
cing challenges in noncapital cases.131 The other approach, the “categ-
orical” approach, typically describes Eighth Amendment challenges to 
a particular punishment based on the offense or a characteristic of the 
offender;132 the Court has utilized this approach almost exclusively in 
capital cases.133 
According to the Court, “[t]he Eighth Amendment, which forbids 
cruel and unusual punishments, contains a ‘narrow proportionality 
principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’”134 To enforce this 
narrow principle, the Court has utilized a three-part test—the gross 
disproportionality approach—to determine whether a particular defend-
ant’s noncapital sentence is unconstitutional: 
The first part of the test consists of a threshold that typically 
bars application of the second and third parts. The threshold 
requires a comparison of offense gravity and sentence severity, 
and a determination of whether this comparison reveals “gross 
disproportionality.” The second and third parts call for an intra-
jurisdictional review of sentences received within the state for 
more and less serious crimes, and an interjurisdictional review of 
sentences received in other states for the same crime. If the 
 
131. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 
124 Yale L.J. 3094, 3185 (2015) (indicating the Supreme Court rarely reviews 
prison sentences in noncapital cases, but when it does so, it employs a “gross 
disproportionality” standard). 
132. See, e.g., Linda E. Carter, The Evolution of Justice Kennedy’s Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence on Categorical Bars in Capital Cases, 44 
McGeorge L. Rev. 229 (2013) (explaining categorical bars to the death 
penalty). 
133. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two 
Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 
107 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1155 (2009) (noting cases where the Supreme 
Court has used the categorical approach to refuse to impose the death 
penalty). But see infra notes 164–179 and accompanying text (describing 
the Supreme Court’s recent extension of the categorical approach in the 
context of life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders). 
134. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957, 996–97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment)). 
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threshold is not met, then proportionality analysis ends. Only if 
the threshold is met do courts apply parts two and three.135 
If a court determines a sentence is grossly disproportionate and 
confirms its threshold finding through intrajurisdictional and inter-
jurisdictional comparisons, it will strike down that particular defend-
ant’s sentence.136 
Alternatively, the Supreme Court employs the categorical approach 
“when evaluating a statutory punishment’s constitutionality as applied 
either to a particular criminal offense or a particular class of offend-
ers.”137 Long ago, the Court held that “[t]he [Eighth] Amendment must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”138 To decide whether those evolving 
standards mark a punishment as unconstitutional, 
[t]he Court first considers “objective indicia of society’s standards, 
as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice” to 
determine whether there is a national consensus against the 
sentencing practice at issue. Next, guided by “the standards 
elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own 
understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
text, history, meaning, and purpose,” the Court must determine 
in the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the 
punishment in question violates the Constitution.139 
Under this approach, when the Court determines a punishment is 
unconstitutional, it creates a categorical prohibition that exempts indiv-
iduals convicted of certain crimes or belonging to a particular class of 
offenders from the challenged punishment.140 
The gross disproportionality approach provides next to no space for 
individuals sentenced to life without the possibility of parole to chall-
enge their punishment on Eighth Amendment grounds. The categorical 
approach is superior to the gross disproportionality approach for several 
 
135. Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal 
Sentencing, 40 Ariz. St. L.J. 527, 529 (2008) (citations omitted). 
136. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment) (describing the outcomes in Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277 (1983) and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)). 
137. Bidish J. Sarma, How Hall v. Florida Transforms the Supreme Court’s 
Eighth Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Analysis, 62 UCLA 
L. Rev. Discourse 186, 192 (2014). 
138. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
139. Ian P. Farrell, Strict Scrutiny Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 Fla. St. 
U. L. Rev. 853, 859 (2013) (citations omitted). 
140. See Sarma, supra note 137, at 192 (exempting individuals convicted of 
certain crimes from execution). 
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reasons: the gross disproportionality approach is doctrinally incoherent; 
the Supreme Court has almost entirely sapped whatever potency the 
gross disproportionality approach may have once retained in theory (if 
it ever had any); the categorical approach provides a meaningful frame-
work within which individuals sentenced to die in prison for minor or 
nonviolent offenses can situate their claims for constitutional relief; and 
the categorical approach provides for uniformity—a value that evades 
the gross disproportionality approach altogether. And although its ear-
lier jurisprudence once suggested that all noncapital Eighth Amend-
ment challenges would be subjected to review under the gross dispro-
portionality test, the Supreme Court has recently clarified and deepened 
its commitment to the categorical approach even in the noncapital 
context. For these reasons—explored more in-depth in this Part—this 
Article ultimately evaluates the Eighth Amendment question posed by 
life without parole sentences imposed on nonviolent offenders by using 
the Supreme Court’s categorical approach and the accompanying an-
alytical framework.141 
Among its prominent drawbacks, the gross disproportionality 
approach rests upon unstable jurisprudential foundations.142 The test 
that until recently ostensibly governed claims that punishments in 
noncapital cases were cruel and unusual first appeared in Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Harmelin in 1991.143 Confusion reigned 
even before Harmelin and well before the Court’s own eventual, albeit 
tentative,144 embrace of Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion.145 When  
141. For a critique of the idea that these two approaches can be meaningfully 
distinguished, see O’Hear, supra note 27, at 1111. 
142. See Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The 
Supreme Court’s Tortured Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 
84 Ky. L.J. 107, 107 (1996) (“The result of [a] series of flawed opinions 
from the Supreme Court is that the state of the law with respect to 
proportionality in sentencing is confused, and what law can be discerned 
rests on weak foundations.”). 
143. See Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive 
Punishment, 91 Va. L. Rev. 677, 693 (2005) (“There was no majority 
opinion [in Harmelin], but the opinion that eventually came to assume 
the status of law was Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion . . . .”); see 
also id. at 693 n.79 (citing cases); see also Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, 
and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to Constitutional 
Discourse, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 111, 149 n.199 (2007) (noting that 
courts have continued to apply Justice Kennedy’s test from Harmelin). 
144. In 2003, a plurality of the Court indicated that “[t]he proportionality 
principles . . . distilled in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence guide our application 
of the Eighth Amendment.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, at 23–24 (2003) 
(plurality opinion). 
145. See, e.g., Scott K. Petersen, Note, The Punishment Need Not Fit the Crime: 
Harmelin v. Michigan and the Eighth Amendment, 20 Pepp. L. Rev. 747, 
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he set forth the test, Justice Kennedy pointed out that “[t]hough our 
decisions recognize a proportionality principle, its precise contours are 
unclear.”146 The Court’s inconsistent articulation of the proportionality 
principle’s scope and its repeated failure to use a consistent test for 
determining whether a sentence was disproportionate prompted it to 
admit that its “precedents in this area have not been a model of 
clarity. . . . Indeed, in determining whether a particular sentence for a 
term of years can violate the Eighth Amendment, we have not estab-
lished a clear or consistent path for courts to follow.”147 Not once has a 
majority of justices in a self-contained opinion adopted the gross dis-
proportionality test. Given the history of an approach that has, at best, 
developed in fits and starts,148 it may be that the next time the justices 
return to the approach, they will inaugurate another doctrinal shift, 
return to an old and substantively different formulation of the test, or 
perhaps abandon the underlying proportionality principle altogether.149 
 
761 (1993) (“In the 1980 decision of Rummel v. Estelle, the Supreme Court 
retreated from its past decisions that incorporated a proportionality 
guarantee in the Eighth Amendment.”). 
146. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, at 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
147. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003); see also Sara Taylor, 
Commentary, Unlocking the Gates of Desolation Row, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 
1810, 1815 (2012) (“Moreover, to the extent that the Court has used the 
Punishments Clause to review noncapital sentences, it has not provided a 
clear doctrine for lower courts, plaintiffs, and attorneys to follow in 
dealing with challenges to noncapital sentences.”). 
148. See Lee, supra note 143, at 692–93 (“The key cases . . . sit uneasily with each 
other, and there is still much uncertainty about how the case law will 
eventually settle, especially given the rarity of majority opinions in this area.”). 
149. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 147, at 1819 (2012) (“One source of uncertainty 
is a consistent thread of pluralities, concurrences, and dissents that have 
pushed back against the presence of any proportionality requirement in the 
noncapital context, suggesting that the principle could lose the support of a 
majority of the Court in the future.”); see also id. at 1815 (“In each of the 
rare cases in which the Court has confronted an Eighth Amendment challenge 
to a noncapital sentence, it has applied a different rubric for analyzing the 
gravity of the offense. While some of the modes of analysis vary only slightly, 
in other cases the approach is completely different from anything the Court 
has done in the past. As a result, it is not clear how a court will review a 
given noncapital sentence to determine if it is grossly disproportionate, 
making it exceedingly difficult for prisoners to bring successful claims.”). 
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Not only is the gross disproportionality test unstable,150 but it has 
also proven to be toothless. The case law is “sparse,”151 but the 
outcomes in a pair of 2003 Supreme Court cases, Ewing v. California152 
and Lockyer v. Andrade,153 make clear that efforts to challenge long 
prison terms under the gross disproportionality approach are likely to 
fail.154 In Ewing, the Supreme Court upheld a defendant’s sentence of 
twenty-five years to life under California’s three-strikes regime in which 
“[t]he sentence-triggering criminal conduct consist[ed] of the theft of 
three golf clubs priced at a total of $1,197.”155 And in Andrade, the 
Court reversed a lower court’s grant of habeas relief to a defendant 
whom was sentenced to two consecutive twenty-five-to-life prison terms 
under California’s three-strikes law for the theft of nine videotapes 
valued at approximately $150.156 These cases culminate in what one 
commentator has called the “enfeeblement of the Eighth Amendment’s 
proportionality requirement.”157 
Many legal scholars, litigants, and commentators have critiqued the 
gross disproportionality approach because it essentially commands 
courts to defer to legislatures and prosecutors, removing extremely 
harsh sentences from the Constitution’s reach. The words of Professors 
Steiker and Steiker appropriately summarize these critiques: “The app-
lication of this . . . threshold requirement of gross disproportionality 
has proven to be an insurmountable hurdle for Eighth Amendment 
challenges to long prison terms.”158 In other words, unless one subscribes 
 
150. See also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 86 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(“Our Court has struggled with whether and how to apply the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause to sentences for noncapital crimes.”). 
151. Jackson, supra note 131, at 3185 (“The Court has repeatedly considered 
the proportionality of death sentences and held them to be unconst-
itutional . . . but its non-capital case law has been parsimonious in reviewing 
prison sentences under the ‘gross disproportionality’ standard. Indeed, the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment case law on non-capital sentences for adult 
offenders is sparse.”). 
152. 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
153.  538 U.S. 63 (2003).  
154. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 
Stan. L. Rev. 1049, 1059 (2004) (“In 2003, in Ewing and Andrade, the 
Court greatly weakened, if not almost eliminated, proportionality review, 
as applied to prison sentences.”). 
155. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 35 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
156. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003) (describing the appellate 
court’s disposition). 
157. Nilsen, supra note 143, at 151. 
158. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening A Window or Building A 
Wall? The Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy 
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to the premise that the Constitution does not entail a proportionality 
principle—a stance that one current Supreme Court justice defends159—
the current situation is bleak. The Constitution itself promises that the 
government will not inflict cruel and unusual punishments on indivi-
duals, but the Court has essentially decided that no noncapital sentence 
will ever be deemed unconstitutional. Rather than acknowledge that it 
has failed to devise an enforceable remedy to protect the individual’s 
Eighth Amendment right,160 the Court has instead determined that the 
right means so little that it may as well not exist.161 
While it may seem that the jurisprudence forecloses a meaningful 
Eighth Amendment challenge to life without parole sentences for 
individuals convicted of nonviolent offenses, the Court’s other app-
roach, the categorical approach, provides an alternative well worth 
exploring. Before 2010, the Court only utilized this approach in death 
 
on Criminal Justice More Broadly, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 155, 186 
(2008); see also Taylor, supra note 147, at 1835 (“The doctrine is so 
narrow and forbids only such extreme sentences that it allows relief in a 
vanishingly small number of cases and allows almost any sentence to pass 
constitutional muster. The combination of an extremely high doctrinal 
standard and an extremely deferential treatment of state decisions allows 
the Court to conclude that sentences that are extremely harsh in 
comparison to the crime committed—sentences that should be viewed as 
grossly disproportionate—do not violate the proportionality principle.”). 
159. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“In my 
view, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
contains no proportionality principle.”). Justice Scalia, who recently passed 
away, shared Justice Thomas’s view about proportionality. See Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 985 (1991) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (finding 
“that those who framed and approved the Federal Constitution chose . . . not 
to include within it the guarantee against disproportionate sentences”). 
160. See Nilsen, supra note 143, at 175 (“By failing to recognize the actual 
consequences of a prison sentence as punishment, and by creating consti-
tutional tests that deflect and deter Eighth Amendment challenges, the 
Supreme Court has blindly and cruelly accepted form over substance, thus 
abdicating its responsibility as a guardian of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
161. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 147, at 1816 (“The Court’s failure to develop a 
meaningful Eighth Amendment doctrine in the noncapital context has left a 
doctrinal vacuum in which the Court’s articulation of the proportionality test 
is . . . so weak that it fails to adequately limit unconstitutional sentences.”). 
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penalty cases.162 Then, in Graham v. Florida,163 the Court struck down 
the practice of sentencing juvenile offenders to life without the poss-
ibility of parole for nonhomicide crimes.164 The categorical prohibition 
in Graham demonstrates that the Court no longer confines the 
categorical approach to death penalty cases. Whether Graham presages 
an extension of the categorical analysis to a broad range of prison-term 
sentences (beyond undeniably harsh life without the possibility of 
parole sentences)165 or instead a demarcation of the approach’s outer 
boundary,166 the precedent has been set for the sentence at issue here. 
In order for the Court to undertake the categorical approach, the 
party challenging a sentencing practice must claim that a government 
cannot subject to that particular sentence either a person convicted of 
“a type of crime” or a person who falls within “a class of individuals.”167 
Coker v. Georgia168 provides an example of the “type of crime” chall-
enge.169 In that case, the Court categorically prohibited all jurisdictions 
 
162. See William W. Berry III, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than 
Death: The Argument for According Life Without Parole Its Own Category 
of Heightened Review Under the Eighth Amendment After Graham v. 
Florida, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 1109, 1111 (2010) (“The United States Supreme 
Court’s application of the Eighth Amendment over the past fifty years has 
clearly divided capital and non-capital cases. This dual approach has rested 
on the Court’s oft-repeated notion that ‘death-is-different,’ . . . .”); Graham 
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2009) (noting that “previous cases” invoking 
the categorical approach “involved the death penalty”); id. at 61 (“The 
present case involves an issue the Court has not considered previously: a 
categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence.”). 
163. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  
164. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (“The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a 
life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit 
homicide.”); see also Berry III, supra note 162, at 1111–12 (“In Graham, the 
Court applied its ‘evolving standards of decency’ standard, heretofore reserved 
for capital cases, to hold that the Eighth Amendment prohibited states from 
sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole for non-homicide crimes.”). 
165. See Jackson, supra note 131, at 3188 (“Whether these cases [including 
Graham] foreshadow a broader willingness to take a harder look at the 
constitutional proportionality of noncapital sentences is uncertain.”); Taylor, 
supra note 147, at 1817–18 (noting that the “Graham decision[] may suggest 
a new willingness to expand the Eighth Amendment doctrine”). 
166. See Berry III, supra note 162, at 1126 (making the claim that “life without 
parole can be clearly differentiated from all other non-capital sentences”). 
167. Carter, supra note 132, at 234; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 60 (explaining 
that “one [subset of categorical challenges] consider[s] the nature of the 
offense, the other consider[s] the characteristics of the offender”). 
168.  433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
169. Id. at 592 (exemplifying a “type of crime” challenge). 
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from sentencing to death an individual convicted of the crime of  
rape of an adult woman.170 It found that the “sentence of death 
is . . . excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore 
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment . . . .”171 Examples of cases in 
which “a class of individuals” was exempted from a punishment include 
Atkins v. Virginia172 and Roper v. Simmons.173 In those cases, the Court 
prohibited jurisdictions from sentencing to death individuals with 
intellectual disabilities174 and juvenile offenders (under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the crime)175 respectively. 
Categorical challenges to a punishment need not separate the “type 
of crime” and “class of individuals” categories. While the Court historic-
ally dealt with challenges involving one or the other, in Graham, the 
Court ruled on a claim that “implicate[d] a particular type of sentence 
as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range 
of crimes.”176 The petitioner successfully combined a claim involving a 
“class of individuals”—juvenile offenders—and a “type of crime”—all 
nonhomicide crimes. 
A categorical challenge to life without the possibility of parole 
sentences for individuals convicted of nonviolent offenses represents a 
challenge based on the type of crime or “nature of the offense.”177 Put 
simply, the challenge asserts that because the offenses for which these 
individuals were sentenced to die in prison were not violent in nature, 
 
170. See id. The Court also later held that the death penalty is an unconstitutional 
punishment for the crime of child rape. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 
U.S. 407, 446–47 (2008). 
171. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. 
172. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Constitution 
restricts imposition of the death penalty on persons with intellectual 
disabilities).  
173. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the Constitution 
prohibits imposition of the death penalty on persons under the age of eighteen).  
174. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that “we therefore conclude that such 
punishment is excessive and that the Constitution ‘places a substantive 
restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded 
offender”). The Court recently explained that although “[p]revious opinions 
of this Court have employed the term ‘mental retardation,’” the Court now 
“uses the term ‘intellectual disability’ to describe the identical phenomenon.” 
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). For more information about 
Hall, see Sarma, supra note 137, at 201. 
175. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding that the “Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were 
under the age of [eighteen] when their crimes were committed”). 
176. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010). 
177. Id. at 60. 
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the Eighth Amendment prohibits this “second most severe [sentence] 
known to the law”178—and the most severe sentence possibly available 
for those crimes.179 That the categorical approach is available means 
that the gross disproportionality approach can be bypassed altogether. 
The mere availability of a categorical challenge, however, does not 
prove that the approach avoids the downsides that attend the gross 
disproportionality approach. Indeed, a great deal of ink has been spilled 
in critique of the categorical approach as well.180 But unlike the gross 
disproportionality approach, the categorical approach is not incoherent, 
unstable, and impotent. 
In terms of doctrinal coherence, the categorical approach is far 
better developed and much more stable than its counterpart. To start, 
only a plurality of justices has adopted the current formulation of the 
gross disproportionality test that Justice Kennedy crafted in Harmelin 
and Justice O’Connor utilized in Ewing.181 By contrast, a majority of 
justices has repeatedly reaffirmed the Court’s approach to identifying 
evolving standards of decency and exercising independent judgment of 
a punishment.182 Not only does the categorical approach have multiple 
definite majority opinions establishing the Court’s commitment to it, 
but it also has proven to be a stable doctrine over a number of cases 
spanning several years.183 And, whereas litigants and courts lack clear 
 
178. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
179. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008) (holding the death 
penalty unconstitutional for nonhomicide offenses against individuals 
(excluding crimes like terrorism and espionage)). 
180. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith, Bidish J. Sarma & Sophie Cull, The Way the 
Court Gauges Consensus (and How to Do It Better), 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 
2397, 2415–18 (2014) (canvassing the critiques of the categorical approach). 
181. See supra notes 143–144 (explaining how Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
in Harmelin guides the Court’s application of the Eighth Amendment). 
182. See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 61 (describing the Court’s sentencing 
approach under categorical rules); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 
(2014) (identifying standards of decency and using the Court’s independent 
judgment to determine whether to impose the death penalty on people with 
intellectual disabilities). 
183. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008); Graham, 560 U.S. at 60–61 (2010); Hall, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2002–03 (2014) (drawing on the categorical approach to determine the 
constitutionality of sentencing decisions); see also William W. Berry III, 
Eighth Amendment Differentness, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 1053, 1066 (2013) 
(“Beginning in 2002, the Court has narrowly decided five cases holding that 
the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits a certain type of offender or 
offense from receiving a certain punishment.”); see also Carter, supra note 
132, at 246 (“Justice Kennedy’s powerful opinions using and defending this 
test provide consistency and integrity to the Court’s decisions in this area.”). 
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guidance on how the gross disproportionality approach really applies,184 
“the Court has developed and applied an increasingly sophisticated 
form of the [categorical] analysis on more than a dozen occasions.”185 
Although one could certainly critique the Supreme Court’s entire 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence (including the fact that two separate 
approaches apply in different contexts),186 there is no doubt that be-
tween the two approaches, the categorical approach is more well-
established and more stable. 
The categorical approach is also superior because it demonstrates a 
capacity to detect and strike down punishments that are cruel and 
unusual. On the other hand, the gross disproportionality approach guts 
the Eighth Amendment protection because “the Court has treated pro-
portionality as essentially lacking enforceable content in its modern 
cases concerning other [noncapital] punishments.”187 It is so weak that 
one might conclude the only viable claim of disproportionality would 
arise from a life sentence imposed on someone for a parking meter 
violation.188 Because gross disproportionality enshrines nearly absolute 
deference to legislatures that adopt criminal sentencing laws,189 the  
184. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (“Our cases exhibit a lack 
of clarity regarding what factors may indicate gross disproportionality.”). 
185. Smith, Sarma & Cull, supra note 180, at 2406. 
186. Indeed, many have. See, e.g., Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth 
Amendment Mess, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 475, 477 (2005) (“One 
would be hard pressed to identify any other area of constitutional law 
plagued by such confusion at its very roots.”); John F. Stinneford, The 
Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel 
Innovation, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1739, 1740 (2008) (“The feeling that 
modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has gone off the rails has arisen, 
at least in part, from the wildly inconsistent rulings that have emanated 
from the Supreme Court over the past few decades . . . .”). 
187. Stacy, supra note 186, at 499. 
188. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 986 n.11 (1991) (plurality opinion); 
id. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 
n.11 (1980) (plurality opinion); id. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing 
how disproportionate punishment offends the American justice system). 
189. See generally James J. Brennan, Note, The Supreme Court’s Excessive 
Deference to Legislative Bodies Under Eighth Amendment Sentencing Review, 
94 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 551 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should take a more assertive role against legislation that favors excessive prison 
sentencing). Some commentators have equated the gross disproportionality 
test with the notoriously weak and deferential Fourteenth Amendment 
rational basis test. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 143, at 741 (“The deferential 
nature of the Ewing Court’s disjunctive theory renders the prohibition on 
excessive punishment probably only as strong as a rational basis inquiry would 
permit, which is not very strong at all.”); Christopher J. DeClue, Comment, 
Sugarcoating the Eighth Amendment: The Grossly Disproportionate Test Is 
Simply the Fourteenth Amendment Rational Basis Test in Disguise, 41 Sw. 
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categorical approach actually represents a better mechanism to enforce 
and give some perceptible meaning to the Constitution’s ban on cruel 
and unusual punishments. The fact that several challengers have per-
suaded the Court to strike down sentencing practices stands in stark 
contrast to the lone outlier case in which an individual prevailed on a 
claim of disproportionality.190 
One other major comparative advantage of the categorical 
approach is that, by definition, it ensures that the Eighth Amendment 
will apply uniformly across the country.191 The gross disproportionality 
test requires individual judges to make case-specific Eighth Amendment 
determinations on a case-by-case basis.192 The categorical approach, on 
the other hand, empowers the U.S. Supreme Court to make binding 
determinations followed by all other courts.193 To the extent that unifor-
mity is a key value in the context of constitutional interpretation, the 
categorical approach protects that value, and the gross disproportion-
ality approach sacrifices it, at least in theory.194 
 
L. Rev. 533, 570 (2012) (“In 1993, Justice Stevens described the Fourteenth 
Amendment rational basis test as ‘tantamount to no review at all.’ It is time 
for the Court to accept that the grossly disproportionate test is no different, 
and, by doing so, the Court must admit that the grossly disproportionate test 
is simply a rational basis test in disguise.”) (footnote omitted). 
190. Barkow, supra note 133, at 1160 (“There has been only a single case in the 
Court’s history in which a term of incarceration, standing alone, was held to 
be disproportionate to an otherwise validly defined crime.”). See Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding that a sentence to life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole was disproportionate to the defendant’s relatively 
minor criminal offense); see also Berry III, supra note 183, at 1065 (“Solem, 
though, is an outlier in light of the Court’s decisions [concerning] . . . similar 
cases of disproportional sentences in non-capital cases.”). 
191. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 132, at 231 (explaining that “categorical bars 
completely preclude the death penalty when they apply”); Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“A decision that a 
given punishment is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot 
be reversed short of a constitutional amendment.”). 
192. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77 (2010) (contrasting the Court’s categorical 
approach with the “case-specific gross disproportionality inquiry”); see also 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 52 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[A]pplication of the Eighth Amendment to a sentence of a term of years 
requires a case-by-case approach.”). 
193. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be 
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the [] penalty under 
the Eighth Amendment.”). 
194. See supra notes 150–161 and accompanying text (explaining why in 
practice very few courts ever find any punishment grossly disproportion-
ate to the crime). There is near uniformity on the ground because the Court 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 2·2015 
The Emerging Eighth Amendment Consensus Against Life Without Parole 
Sentences for Nonviolent Offenses 
560 
The inadequacies that plague the gross disproportionality approach 
render it an unsuitable vehicle for considering the claim that it is 
unconstitutional to sentence individuals convicted of nonviolent off-
enses to life without the possibility of parole. Because the constitutional 
issue here provides a clear category upon which to base a categorical 
challenge and because the categorical approach is far better equipped 
to deal meaningfully with the emerging facts, the appropriate Eighth 
Amendment framework is clear. The questions that remain are whether 
the Supreme Court should find that a national consensus against the 
sentencing practice exists, and, if it does, whether it should also find in 
its independent judgment that the punishment is unconstitutional. 
III. Evaluating the Case for an Eighth Amendment 
Categorical Ban of Life Without the Possibility  
of Parole Sentence for Individuals Convicted  
of Nonviolent Offenses 
This Part evaluates the strength of the claim that the Eighth 
Amendment categorically prohibits life without parole sentences for 
individuals convicted of nonviolent offenses.195 This Part proceeds in 
two subparts: the first evaluates whether a national consensus against 
the sentencing practice exists and the second evaluates whether the 
Supreme Court’s independent judgment would support either the elim-
ination or retention of the challenged practice. These sub-parts corres-
pond to the two inquiries the Court undertakes when dealing with cat-
egorical challenges.196 This Part concludes that evolving standards of 
decency have evolved to the point that the Court could strike down the 
punishment. 
A. Evaluating Objective Evidence of a National Consensus 
To determine whether a national consensus exists, the Supreme 
Court “considers a number of factors . . . : the number of [jurisdictions] 
that authorize the punishment; legislative direction of change; the 
 
has interpreted the proportionality principle so narrowly that the discretion 
of individual judges on a case-by-case basis is quite limited. 
195. This Part in particular relies heavily on the ACLU’s report, “A Living Death: 
Life Without Parole for Nonviolent Offenses.” Supra note 4. Though the 
report was issued in 2013, for reasons explored in more depth below, we 
believe that the numbers relevant to the categorical approach have not 
changed significantly and have not changed in a way that would alter the 
outcome of the test. 
196. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s two 
inquiries as (1) the social standards reflected in legislative enactments and 
state practices and (2) the constitutionality of the punishment). 
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number of sentences imposed; . . . and the degree of geographic isol-
ation.”197 These factors help the Court determine accurately whether a 
particular punishment has fallen out of favor. Each of these factors is 
considered below in turn. 
1. The Number of Jurisdictions That Authorize the Punishment  
and the Number That Prohibit It 
As part of its consensus analysis, the Supreme Court has always 
considered the number of jurisdictions—counting all of the states and 
the federal government—that legislatively authorize the punishment. 
According to the Court, “the legislative judgment weighs heavily in 
ascertaining such standards.”198 The number of jurisdictions that pro-
hibit a punishment is not necessarily an outcome-determinative factor, 
but it can “weigh[] very heavily” in favor of an Eighth Amendment 
prohibition, especially if the number reflects a vast majority.199 
At the time the ACLU published its report on life without parole 
sentences for nonviolent offenders, the federal government and “22 
states permit[ted] LWOP sentences for certain nonviolent crimes.”200 In 
other words, twenty-eight states did not permit the punishment. Look-
ing at the cases in which the Court has found a consensus against a 
punishment, they indicate that, given the numbers here, this factor does  
197. Smith, Sarma & Cull, supra note 180, at 2406. 
198. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (stating that “[t]he beginning 
point [of the Eighth Amendment analysis] is a review of objective indicia 
of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures 
that have addressed the question”); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 
(1989) (indicating that the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence 
of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s 
legislatures”), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). 
199. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 595–96 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“The 
upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the 
present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is 
an adult woman . . . . The current judgment with respect to the death 
penalty for rape is not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it 
obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment 
as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.”). 
200. Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 23; see also id. at 39 (listing the 
jurisdictions that permit life without parole for certain nonviolent offenses: 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Wisconsin, 
Wyoming, and the federal government). This number is comparable to a 
determination of the number of states that permit life without parole for 
nonviolent offenses done in a 2013 law review Note. See generally Hall, supra 
note 63 (indicating that twenty-two states and the federal government 
authorize the punishment).  
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not weigh heavily in favor of striking down the punishment. For 
example, in Coker, Georgia was the only jurisdiction that permitted the 
challenged punishment.201 In Kennedy, the Court found that forty-four 
states did not permit the challenged punishment.202 Unlike Kennedy and 
Coker, the number of jurisdictions that prohibit life without parole for 
nonviolent offenses does not approach a level that demonstrates to the 
Court that legislatures have almost universally rejected the punish-
ment. 
While the count of twenty-eight does not compare as favorably to 
the head counts in Coker and Kennedy, in both Atkins and Simmons 
the Court found that thirty states disallowed the execution of members 
of the relevant class of offenders.203 And, in Graham, “the Court ultim-
ately found a national consensus even though it tallied only thirteen 
jurisdictions that banned life without parole for juveniles.”204 Here, the 
number itself—twenty-eight—is not dispositive. Given that the Court 
proceeded to evaluate other factors in Graham (which only had a count 
of thirteen), and detected a national consensus in Atkins, Simmons, and 
Graham, the fact that more than half of the jurisdictions in the country 
do not permit life without parole sentences for nonviolent offenses 
makes clear that a meaningful analysis of other consensus factors is 
warranted.205 
 
201. Coker, 433 U.S. at 595–96 (plurality opinion). 
202. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 423 (2008). 
203. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 564 (“When Atkins was decided, [thirty] States 
prohibited the death penalty for the mentally retarded . . . . By a similar 
calculation in this case, [thirty] States prohibit the juvenile death 
penalty . . . .”). 
204. Smith, Sarma & Cull, supra note 180, at 2407–08. 
205. The other factors should be evaluated for an additional reason. As explored 
in Part I, some legislatures that made it possible to punish individuals 
convicted of nonviolent offenses through life without parole sentences may 
not have been targeting the particular offenders who have actually been 
punished accordingly. Instead, law enforcement officials have enforced 
textually overbroad laws to punish individuals that legislators may have 
never envisioned. See, e.g., Mandatory Minimum Penalties 2011, supra 
note 32, and accompanying text (describing legislation that Congress passed 
without its usual deliberation in order to rapidly respond to a high-profile 
criminal act, thereby overlooking the full impact of the legislation). This 
concept touches on a strand of the Eighth Amendment consensus juris-
prudence that has arisen in previous cases at the Supreme Court. The Court 
has reasoned that it cannot divine legislators’ intentions where the statutory 
scheme that renders a person eligible for the challenged punishment does so 
by circuitous or indirect means. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 
66–67 (2010) (“The Court confronted a similar situation in Thompson, where 
a plurality concluded that the death penalty for offenders younger than 
[sixteen] was unconstitutional. A number of States then allowed the juvenile 
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2. The Direction of Legislative Change 
The Court looks beyond the number of jurisdictions that authorize 
or prohibit a punishment and assesses the direction in which juris-
dictions are moving. In Atkins, the Court held that “[i]t is not so much 
the number of these States [that prohibit the sentencing practice] that 
is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”206 In mak-
ing the assessment about the direction of change, the Court evaluates 
whether jurisdictions have prohibited the challenged sentencing pract-
ice and whether others have reinstated or entrenched it.207 “The Court’s 
analysis thus searches for uniformity in the direction, along with some 
(undefined) number of jurisdictions to undergird that shift.”208 
 
death penalty if one considered the statutory scheme. As is the case here, 
those States authorized the transfer of some juvenile offenders to adult court; 
and at that point there was no statutory differentiation between adults and 
juveniles with respect to authorized penalties. The plurality concluded that 
the transfer laws show ‘that the States consider [fifteen]-year-olds to be old 
enough to be tried in criminal court for serious crimes (or too old to be dealt 
with effectively in juvenile court), but tells us nothing about the judgment 
these States have made regarding the appropriate punishment for such 
youthful offenders.’ . . . The same reasoning obtains here. Many States have 
chosen to move away from juvenile court systems and to allow juveniles to 
be transferred to, or charged directly in, adult court under certain circum-
stances. Once in adult court, a juvenile offender may receive the same 
sentence as would be given to an adult offender, including a life without 
parole sentence. But the fact that transfer and direct charging laws make life 
without parole possible for some juvenile nonhomicide offenders does not 
justify a judgment that many States intended to subject such offenders to 
life without parole sentences . . . . [T]he many States that allow life without 
parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders but do not impose the punishment 
should not be treated as if they have expressed the view that the sentence is 
appropriate.”) (citations omitted); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2472 
(2012) (“We reasoned that in those circumstances, it was impossible to 
say whether a legislature had endorsed a given penalty . . . .”). As one 
commentator has explained, “Graham and Miller also indicate that 
inadvertence in authorizing a challenged sentence may diminish the deference 
that would normally be shown to legislative policy choices.” O’Hear, supra 
note 27, at 1126. 
206. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002). 
207. See Smith, Sarma & Cull, supra note 180, at 2410 (“In Atkins, the Court 
noted that a ‘large number of States’—sixteen—took the death penalty off 
the table for mentally retarded offenders after the Court rejected the Eighth 
Amendment claim in Penry v. Lynaugh, and there was a ‘complete absence 
of States passing legislation reinstating’ the penalty for the same class of 
individuals. The Court also relied on ‘direction’ in Simmons, holding that 
‘the same consistency of direction of change’ had ‘been demonstrated’ where 
no state reinstated the juvenile death penalty after Stanford [v. Kentucky] 
and five states prohibited it in fifteen years.”) (footnotes omitted). 
208. Id. 
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There is widespread evidence that many jurisdictions have recently 
adopted laws that cut back on harsh mandatory minimum sentencing 
laws and habitual offender laws that historically have rendered non-
violent offenders eligible for life without parole sentences.209 Aside from 
California, however, it seems that no jurisdiction has passed a discrete 
law that specifically addresses the narrow sentencing practice at issue 
here. This does not mean that other jurisdictions have not also amended 
certain statutes to take life without parole off the table for nonviolent 
offenses; rather, it speaks to the difficulty of tracking such changes over 
time when statutes may provide for these sentences in a variety of ways. 
For example, a life without parole sentence may be imposed through 
mandatory minimums on the front-end or created through the abolition 
of parole on the back-end. Unlike other sentencing practices considered 
by the Court under the Eighth Amendment—which have generally been 
confined to a jurisdiction’s murder statutes—the difficulty of identifying 
nonviolent life without parole-eligible offenses renders traditional “head 
counting” of states much more difficult. For this reason, an examination 
of actual usage of the punishment—how often the sentence is imposed—
provides a more readily available and reliable gauge. 
Political and legislative movement away from the types of laws that 
resulted in the lifetime incarceration of nonviolent offenders may still 
play a critical role in the consensus analysis. The evidence of such a 
movement was set out in Part I.D. It includes the President’s recent 
grants of clemency, state legislative reforms, and public statements 
from leading officials. There appear to be three possible avenues for this 
evidence to influence the Court. First, the Court could consider it rele-
vant to the direction of legislative change factor even if the evidence is 
not totally on-point because it is not tailored to provide relief to 
individuals convicted of nonviolent offenses.210 Second, the Court could 
 
209. See supra Part I.D.4 (describing a nationwide trend to rollback penalties 
imposed under mandatory minimum laws). 
210. This might seem incongruous given that the Court has not attributed full-
blown intent to legislatures that have made individuals eligible for certain 
punishments through complicated statutory schemes. See supra note 205. 
Although it might be odd for the Court to find that laws one or two steps 
removed from the question cannot be relied upon in one circumstance but 
can in the other, “[t]he Court’s recent history demonstrates a steady 
extension in the Eighth Amendment’s reach.” Ian P. Farrell, Abandoning 
Objective Indicia, 122 Yale L.J. Online 303, 309 (2013). In fact, the Court 
has previously considered it persuasive that jurisdictions have passed laws 
making the punishment available but not for the type of offenses that define 
the constitutional challenge. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792 
(1982) (“Moreover, of the eight States which have enacted new death 
penalty statutes since 1978, none authorize capital punishment in such 
circumstances.”). If certain jurisdictions have made life without parole 
available for some crimes but not nonviolent offenses that may be a 
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consider this evidence relevant not to the legislative trend factor but 
instead to its independent judgment.211 And, third, the Court could 
draw upon evidence related to these changes that fits more neatly into 
one of its doctrinal factors. For example, states that have recently 
passed laws prohibiting mandatory life without parole sentences for 
drug crimes will sentence fewer nonviolent offenders to the punishment 
moving forward. This means that the evidence of the broader movement 
has specific effects that the consensus analysis can detect through its 
determination of the number of sentences actually imposed. 
3. The Number of Sentences Imposed 
The Supreme Court’s consensus analysis does not end with the 
simple categorizing and tallying of jurisdictions’ statutes; the Court also 
evaluates a “challenged penalty’s usage when it decides the national 
consensus question.”212 Actual sentencing practices have long mattered 
in this context,213 and recent cases demonstrate that a jurisdiction’s 
usage of a legislatively authorized punishment can matter as much, if 
not more, than the fact that a statute permits it. In 2010: 
Sentencing practices . . . played an important—perhaps dec-
isive—role in the Court’s decision in Graham to bar life without 
the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles who commit 
nonhomicide offenses. More than three-dozen jurisdictions legisla-
tively authorized life without parole . . . for juveniles who commit 
nonhomicide offenses. Florida argued that this widespread display 
of legislative support for the punishment foreclosed a finding that 
a consensus against the punishment exists. The Court labeled 
Florida’s argument “incomplete and unavailing” and reiterated  
development the Court considers. According to the ACLU, “LWOP is now 
used in [forty-nine] states,” but individuals convicted of nonviolent offenses 
have received such sentences in only nine states. Turner & Bunting, supra 
note 4, at 20–23. 
211. See, e.g., infra Part III.B (evaluating the factors that the Court considers 
when exercising independent judgment). The independent judgment prong of 
the evolving standards of decency test is capacious and enables the Court to 
even consider evidence about the state of international law. See Roger P. 
Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International Equipoise, 
53 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 26 (2005) (“[T]he Court in Roper is suggesting that 
international equipoise may be invoked to confirm the Court’s independent 
judgment of what the Constitution requires.”). Under this prong, the Court 
could certainly give some, even if little, weight to the state-level legislative 
developments on habitual offender and mandatory minimum sentencing laws. 
212. Smith, Sarma & Cull, supra note 180, at 2411. 
213. See id. at 2411–13 (explaining how the Court considers the penalty’s 
actual usage to determine whether there is a national consensus against a 
punishment). 
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that “[a]ctual sentencing practices are an important part of the 
Court’s inquiry into consensus.” Where only 129 juvenile offend-
ers were under a sentence of LWOP, the Court indicated there 
was “a consensus against its use.”214 
In situations in which a statute authorizes a particular challenged 
sentencing practice but the jurisdiction never or rarely utilizes it, the 
Court can look past the legislation itself to find that the lack of usage 
better reflects evolving standards of decency. 
In earlier cases, the Court’s usage analysis in consensus cases 
sometimes revealed that the challenged sentencing practice had been 
applied to literally a handful of individuals nationwide.215 Graham 
clarified that the number of sentences handed down should be compared 
to the baseline number of defendants potentially eligible for the 
challenged sentence. “While more common in terms of absolute numb-
ers than the sentencing practices in [other Eighth Amendment cases 
like Enmund and Atkins], the type of sentence at issue is actually as 
rare as those other sentencing practices when viewed in proportion to 
the opportunities for its imposition.”216 The Court thus determined that 
the 123 juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole for non-
homicide crimes received a punishment “as rare” as the handful of death 
sentences highlighted in previous cases because in the year 2007 alone 
juveniles were arrested for over 380,000 aggravated assaults, forcible 
rapes, robberies, burglaries, drug offenses and arson.217 “Such infre-
quency in the imposition of a challenged sentence makes clear that  
214. Id. at 2412–13 (footnotes omitted); see also Sarma, supra note 137, at 199 
(noting that the Court’s 2014 decision in Hall “deepens the Court’s 
commitment to analyzing usage indicators to determine if a state’s legislative 
authorization of a punishment is a meaningful reflection of that state’s 
popular will”). 
215. See, e.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796 (finding relevant that “only three persons 
in that category [where the defendant did not commit the homicide, was not 
present when the killing took place, and did not participate in a plot or scheme 
to murder] are presently sentenced to die”); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 
407, 434 (2008) (finding it relevant that there were “only two individuals now 
on death row in the United States for a nonhomicide offense”). 
216. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 49 (2010). 
217. See id. at 65 (calculating the total number of arrests for aggravated assault, 
rape, robbery, burglary, drug offenses, and arson in 2007); see also Miller 
v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2478–79 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“The Court notes that Graham found a punishment authorized in [thirty-
nine] jurisdictions unconstitutional, whereas the punishment it bans today 
is mandated in [ten] fewer. But Graham went to considerable lengths to 
show that although theoretically allowed in many States, the sentence at 
issue in that case was ‘exceedingly rare’ in practice. The Court explained 
that only 123 prisoners in the entire Nation were serving life without parole 
for nonhomicide crimes committed as juveniles, with more than half in a 
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overturning the sentence will not impose major disruptions on the day-
to-day functioning of state criminal justice systems . . . .”218 
Two numbers seem to matter most in the analysis of sentencing 
practices: (1) the number of people who are sentenced to the challenged 
punishment; and (2) the number of people who are eligible to be 
sentenced to the challenged punishment. The first number may be 
thought of as the “numerator” and second number the “denominator” 
because dividing the first number by the second reveals (an estimate 
of) the percentage of individuals eligible for a punishment that actually 
receive it. The numbers generate for the Court a rough idea of how 
“unusual” a punishment is in reality. 
Here, the relevant numerator appears to be in the ballpark of 3,300 
to 4,500 prisoners. According to the ACLU “as of 2012, there were 3,278 
prisoners serving life without parole for nonviolent drug and property 
crimes in the federal system and in nine states that provided such 
statistics . . . .”219 That number may be somewhat higher because, as 
the ACLU acknowledges, “there may well be more such prisoners in 
[three] other states” that permit the challenged punishment but did not 
disclose information.220 If one assumes for the sake of argument that the 
three jurisdictions that did not share information each had an average 
of 328 inmates under the sentence—the average determined by the 
3,278 prisoners across the ten reporting jurisdictions—there would be 
an additional 984 relevant sentences. That estimate, likely a significant 
overestimate (given that the 3,278 figure includes the federal govern-
ment’s count of more than 2,000 offenders), would put the total number 
at 4,262. For the analysis here—a highly conservative one—we shall 
assume there are 4,500 prisoners serving life without parole for non-
violent offenses. 
Initially, the total number of sentences at issue seems dramatically 
higher than in the other Eighth Amendment categorical ban cases. It is 
far beyond the two offenders in Kennedy, three offenders in Enmund, 
 
single State. It contrasted that with statistics showing nearly 400,000 juveniles 
were arrested for serious nonhomicide offenses in a single year. Based on the 
sentence’s rarity despite the many opportunities to impose it, Graham 
concluded that there was a national consensus against life without parole 
for juvenile nonhomicide crimes.”) (citations omitted). 
218. O’Hear, supra note 27, at 1099. 
219. Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 2; id. at 20 (“According to data 
collected and analyzed by the ACLU, 3,278 prisoners are serving LWOP for 
drug, property, and other nonviolent crimes in the United States as of 2012.”). 
220. Id. at 2; see id. at 24 (noting that Delaware, Virginia, and Nevada did 
not give ACLU data but have life without parole for nonviolent offenses, 
so “the total number of nonviolent LWOP prisoners nationwide is likely 
higher than the ACLU’s data suggests”). 
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and even the 123 in Graham.221 But, to be understood, the number must 
be contextualized; the numerator requires a denominator to obtain real 
meaning under this analysis. Indeed, it is when one tries to determine 
the denominator that the initial image gets shattered. The almost 
astronomical size of the denominator demonstrates that life without 
parole sentences for nonviolent offenses ranks among the rarest sent-
ences the Court has seen. 
It is impossible to drum up an accurate guess for the number of 
nonviolent offenses (as defined earlier in this Article) that occur in any 
given year. In Graham, the Court faced a similar challenge of giving 
“attention . . . to the base number of certain types of offenses” and it 
utilized the statistics that were readily available.222 As a starting place, 
the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) compiled by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) provide a yearly breakdown of property crimes. 
According to the FBI, property crime statistics “include[] the offenses 
of burglary, larceny-theft, [and] motor vehicle theft . . . .”223 In 2013, 
“there were an estimated 8,632,512 property crime offenses in the 
nation.”224 This total provides a very conservative estimate because it 
does not include any drug possession or distribution offenses. The UCR 
separately provides information about the number of arrests in a given 
year for particular categories of crime. This number includes inform-
ation about arrests for drug abuse violations; in 2013, there were an 
estimated 1,501,043 arrests for this category of crimes.225 Creating the 
most conservative estimate, we can assume a one hundred percent 
arrest rate for drug abuse violations and that arrests occurred one-to-
one for each drug crime. In other words, assume there were 1,501,043 
drug crimes. Combined with the 8,632,512 property crimes, that would 
create a total estimate of 10,133,555 crimes for 2013 alone.226  
221. Supra notes 215–217. 
222. Graham, 560 U.S. at 65. 









226. The fact that jurisdictions have been handing down the challenged 
punishment over the span of the past few decades is highly relevant. See 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 65 (“The numbers cited above reflect all current convicts 
in a jurisdiction’s penal system, regardless of when they were convicted. It 
becomes all the more clear how rare these sentences are, even within the 
jurisdictions that do sometimes impose them, when one considers that a 
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Even though it is extraordinarily difficult if not impossible to 
determine how many of these more than 10 million crimes would have 
made a nonviolent offender eligible for a life sentence, the number is 
still instructive. Dealing with a similar dilemma in Graham, the Court 
found that:  
Although it is not certain how many of these numerous [~400,000] 
juvenile offenders were eligible for life without parole sentences, 
the comparison suggests that in proportion to the opportunities 
for its imposition, life without parole sentences for juveniles con-
victed of nonhomicide crimes is as rare as other sentencing pract-
ices found to be cruel and unusual.227  
 Here, too, the “comparison suggests” that life without parole 
sentences for nonviolent offenses are as rare as those juvenile life 
without parole punishments for nonhomicide crimes the Court held 
unconstitutional. Dividing the numerator by the denominator in 
Graham (123/380,480) yields a 0.0323% sentencing rate. Here, that 
same calculation (4,500/10,133,555) yields a 0.0444% sentencing rate. 
Both numbers represent very rough estimates; both numbers are 
infinitesimal; and both numbers reflect the sort of profoundly infrequent 
use that troubles the Court.228 Therefore, this factor—the number of 
sentences imposed—should weigh strongly in favor of an Eighth Amen-
dment ban on the punishment. 
 
juvenile sentenced to life without parole is likely to live in prison for decades. 
Thus, these statistics likely reflect nearly all juvenile nonhomicide offenders 
who have received a life without parole sentence stretching back many years.”). 
227. Graham, 560 U.S. at 65–66. 
228. In Furman v. Georgia, a plurality expressed concern that the death penalty 
was so infrequently applied that it was cruel and unusual where it estimated 
that only fifteen to twenty percent of eligible offenders received the 
punishment. 408 U.S. 238, 386 n.11 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Although accurate figures are difficult to obtain, it is thought that from 
[fifteen percent] to [twenty percent] of those convicted of murder are 
sentenced to death in States where it is authorized.”); see also Steven F. 
Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for 
Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1283, 1288 (1997) (“[T]he Justices’ conclusion 
that the death penalty was imposed only infrequently derived from their 
understanding that only [fifteen to twenty percent] of convicted murderers 
who were death-eligible were being sentenced to death”). That sentencing 
rate is roughly 337 to 450 times greater than the 0.0444% rate for nonviolent 
life without parole offenders generated above. 
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4. The Degree of Geographic Isolation 
A factor the Court implicitly considers when dealing with a cate-
gorical challenge is the degree of the challenged punishment’s geo-
graphic isolation.229 “Geographic isolation describes when a relatively 
small number of jurisdictions that authorize a punishment become 
responsible for the vast majority of the contested sentences imposed.”230 
This factor played a major role in Graham where the Court found that 
one jurisdiction had sentenced “[a] significant majority” of the indivi-
duals serving the challenged punishment.231 All of the remaining sent-
ences had come from “just 10 states.”232 
The geographic distribution of sentences in Graham was partic-
ularly important because thirty-nine jurisdictions (thirty-seven states 
plus the District of Columbia and the federal system) statutorily 
permitted the challenged punishment.233 However, the Court found 
significant the “[a]ctual sentencing practices,” which revealed that “only 
11 jurisdictions nationwide in fact impose life without parole sentences 
on juvenile nonhomicide offenders—and most of those do so quite 
rarely—while 26 States, the District of Columbia, and the Federal 
Government do not impose them despite apparent statutory authori-
zation.”234 Geographic isolation and infrequent usage combined in 
Graham to undermine the states’ claim that there was no consensus 
against a punishment because of the sheer number of jurisdictions that 
technically permitted it. 
Life without parole sentences for nonviolent offenders share a 
similar distributive pattern to the sentences struck down in Graham. 
To start, the number of jurisdictions that actually utilize the sentence 
is much lower than the number that technically authorize it. “In nine 
of these [twenty-two] states [and in the federal system], prisoners are 
currently serving life-without-parole sentences for a nonviolent off-
ense . . . .”235 That number decreased by one in 2015 because Missouri  
229. Smith, Sarma & Cull, supra note 180, at 2414 (“Although the Court has not 
explicitly considered geographic isolation as an independent variable in the 
national consensus analysis (as apart from the number of states that authorize 
a punishment), the Eighth Amendment cases indicate that it plays a role.”). 
230. Id. 
231. Graham, 560 U.S. at 64 (relying on the fact that 77 of the 123 sentences 
had been handed down in Florida). 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 62. 
234. Id. at 62–64. 
235. Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 23; see also id. at 39 (showing the 
nine states are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Carolina). 
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removed the lone prisoner under such a sentence.236 In other words, 
fourteen of the twenty-three authorizing jurisdictions do not actually 
use the punishment.237 Moreover, where Florida was responsible for a 
majority of sentences at issue in Graham, “[n]early two-thirds of these 
prisoners [sentenced to life without parole for nonviolent offenses]—
sixty-three percent—are in the federal system.”238 Only eight other 
jurisdictions use the challenged punishment.239 
5. Summary of the National Consensus Analysis 
The case that there is now a national consensus against life without 
parole sentences for nonviolent offenses appears even stronger than the 
consensus evidence that prevailed in Graham. Substantially more juris-
dictions—fifteen additional states—prohibit the challenged punish-
ment. While the total number of individuals eligible for relief is far 
greater here, the proportion of individuals under the sentence compared 
to the relevant baseline crime statistics strongly suggests that both 
sentences are exceedingly rare.240 Finally, the evidence of geographic 
isolation here is nearly identical to the evidence in Graham: less than 
half of the jurisdictions that permit the punishment actually deploy it, 
and one jurisdiction in particular generates a significant percentage of 
the sentences. Against this backdrop, it appears that there is more than 
enough evidence to support a judicial finding that there is a national 
consensus against life without parole sentences for nonviolent offenses. 
B. Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Independent Judgment 
In exercising its independent judgment, the Supreme Court 
considers “the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes 
and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in 
question . . . . In this inquiry the Court also considers whether the 
challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.”241 
 
236. See Nelson, supra note 84 (explaining that the only prisoner serving life 
without parole for a nonviolent offense was released in 2015). 
237. See Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 16 (explaining that this number 
may actually be eleven, twelve, thirteen, or fourteen because three states 
did not respond to the ACLU’s records requests). 
238. Id. at 23. 
239. See id. at 22 Table 2 (showing the distribution of sentences in 2012). 
240. See also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 65 (2010) (noting that these 
numbers need to be put in the context of the span of many years in which 
individuals could be receiving these life without parole sentences). 
241. Id. at 67. 
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1. The Culpability of the Offenders in Light of Their Crimes 
Culpability matters. In evaluating categorical challenges, the 
Court’s culpability analysis turns on whether the challenge is based on 
“characteristics of the offender” or “the nature of the offense.”242 In 
challenges based on characteristics that define a specific class of offend-
ers, the Court has not sought to determine a specific offender’s level of 
culpability; instead, it has drawn conclusions about culpability based 
on characteristics that generally apply to members within the class. In 
Simmons and Graham, that class of offenders was juvenile offenders;243 
in Atkins and Hall, the class consisted of offenders with intellectual 
disabilities.244 With respect to both classes, the Court found substantial 
reasons to treat their culpability as relatively limited, particularly when 
compared to fully functioning adult offenders. 
For challenges based on the nature of the offense, the Court assesses 
the severity of the crime in light of the sentence. In Coker, the Court 
explained that the serious crime of rape deserves a weighty punishment 
but not a punishment that was only otherwise available for the 
undoubtedly more grave crime of murder. According to the Court: 
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in 
terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to 
the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve 
the unjustified taking of human life. . . . . We have the abiding 
conviction that the death penalty, which ‘is unique in its severity 
and irrevocability,’ . . . is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, 
as such, does not take human life.245 
The Court revisited the point in Kennedy, stating that with respect 
to capital punishment “there is a distinction between intentional first-
 
242. Id. at 60. 
243. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (noting that 
juveniles have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility” (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993))); id. 
(noting that “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative 
influences and outside pressures”); id. at 570 (noting that “the character 
of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult”). 
244. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (noting that 
offenders with intellectual disabilities “have diminished capacities to 
understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from 
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to 
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others”). 
245. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)). 
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degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against indivi-
dual persons . . . on the other.”246 
To date, the Court has not considered a categorical challenge based 
on the nonviolent nature of the offenses. There is no doubt that these 
offenses stand in stark contrast to the murders, rapes, and robberies 
contemplated in the earlier landmark Eighth Amendment cases. Non-
violent crimes are not even crimes against individual persons as the 
Court described in Kennedy because by definition the offenses involve 
no harm or threat of harm to people.247 In an important way, these 
offenses are thus two full steps removed from the homicide crimes that 
in some circumstances warrant capital punishment and one step 
removed from the violent nonhomicide crimes for which the Court has 
found the death penalty unconstitutional. It follows that the Court 
would and should recognize (and perhaps even constitutionalize) the 
distinction between crimes against persons and nonviolent offenses.248 
2. The Severity of the Punishment in Question 
Another consideration relevant to the independent judgment 
analysis is the severity of the punishment. The precedent indicates that 
the Court’s evaluative posture can be described in the following way: 
the more serious the punishment, the more serious the scrutiny. On 
several occasions, “[t]he Court has recognized the severity of sentences 
that deny convicts the possibility of parole.”249 In Graham, the Court 
described how life without parole sentences share important similarities 
to death sentences: “The State does not execute the offender sentenced 
to life without parole, but the sentence alters the offender’s life by a 
forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic 
liberties without giving hope of restoration . . . .”250 The Eighth Amend-
ment cases suggest that the Court will apply substantial independent 
scrutiny to the life without parole sentences at issue. In short, the Court 
 
246. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008). 
247. See Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 18 (defining “nonviolent offenses”).  
248. According to at least one commentator, the Court has already relied on the 
distinction several times in the gross disproportionality context. See Kevin 
White, Comment, Construing the Outer Limits of Sentencing Authority: A 
Proposed Bright-Line Rule for Noncapital Proportionality Review, 2011 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 567, 587 (2011) (“[T]he fundamental distinction of 
whether an offense is nonviolent or violent has constituted a significant 
factor, if not the most significant factor, in the Court’s assessment of the 
gravity of crimes.”). 
249. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010). 
250. Id. at 69–70; see also Berry III, supra note 162, at 1112 (“A sentence of 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is in many ways no 
more than a death sentence without an execution date.”).  
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recognizes that this punishment is “the second most severe penalty 
permitted by law” and the most severe punishment available for nearly 
all crimes but murder.251 
3. The Validity or Invalidity of Penological Goals 
The Court’s independent judgment analysis evaluates whether a 
challenged punishment serves any legitimate penological goals. Four 
traditional goals and justifications for punishment have garnered the 
Court’s recognition: deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and incapa-
citation.252 This Part considers each in turn. 
a. Deterrence 
Deterrence is a justification for punishment premised on the theory 
that the punishment can deter individuals from breaking the law. Two 
aspects in particular may contribute to a punishment’s potential effect-
iveness as a deterrent – the certainty that the punishment will apply 
and the severity of the punishment. 
The severity of a life without parole sentence is nearly without 
match. One might be tempted to believe that this maximally harsh 
sentence would thus clearly yield the greatest deterrent value when 
compared to other punishments. However, “there is little evidence that 
increases in the length of already long prison sentences yield general 
deterrent effects that are sufficiently large to justify their social and 
economic costs.”253 Indeed, the general proposition that sentence sever-
ity effectively deters crime is being called into question. Years of 
research and results from study after study have led many crimino-
logists to conclude “[t]here is no plausible body of evidence that supp-
orts policies based on this premise [that harsh sentences deter] . . . .”254 
Compared to punishment severity, the certainty of punishment is 
much more likely to provide a deterrent effect.255 According to a leading 
expert on deterrence, “evidence in support of the deterrent effect of 
various measures of the certainty of punishment is far more convincing  
251. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment). 
252. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003). 
253. Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 Crime & 
Just. 199, 201 (2013). 
254. Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: 
Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 Crime & Just. 143, 146 (2003). 
255. Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal 
Deterrence?, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 765, 818 (2010) (“[T]here 
does seem to be a modest inverse relationship between the perceived 
certainty of punishment and crime, but no real evidence of a deterrent 
effect for severity . . . .”). 
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and consistent than for the severity of punishment.”256 Yet, the type of 
certainty that generally accepted research has demonstrated can have 
a deterrent effect is an offender’s certainty that he will be appre-
hended.257 This type of certainty should be distinguished from the 
certainty that a particular sentence will be given. “Consequently, the 
conclusion that certainty, not severity, is the more effective deterrent 
is more precisely stated as certainty of apprehension and not the sever-
ity of the legal consequence ensuing from apprehension is the more 
effective deterrent.”258 In other words, harsh sentencing regimes like life 
without parole have not been proven to have deterrent effects along the 
certainty dimension. 
With respect to life without parole sentences for nonviolent crimes, 
there are reasons to believe that certainty does not play a meaningful 
role in deterring offenders. To the extent perceptions reflect reality in 
the deterrence realm,259 a potential nonviolent offender is likely to be 
less concerned about apprehension than the potential violent offender 
because arrest rates for nonviolent crimes are much lower.260 More 
importantly, there is no basis to believe that potential offenders would 
envision receiving a life without parole sentence for nonviolent offenses 
because even among those individuals apprehended, very few actually 
end with this punishment. The sentence’s rarity—it’s imposition in 
some microscopic percentage of nonviolent cases261—undermines its 
ability to deter.262 
On the whole, deterrence may provide some support for the chall-
enged sentencing practice, but that support is underwhelming. Standing 
 
256. Nagin, supra note 253, at 201. 
257. See id. at 201–02 (“[T]he evidence in support of certainty’s deterrent effect 
pertains almost exclusively to apprehension probability.”). 
258. Id. at 202. 
259. See Paternoster, supra note 255, at 804 (“There is evidence that would-
be offenders are not completely unmindful of the objective risks and costs 
they run if they commit crimes, but the correlations are rather meager 
and must be disappointing to believers in deterrence.”). 
260. See, e.g., Crime in the United States: Clearances, Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation (2013) https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-
the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/ 
clearances/clearancetopic_final [http://perma.cc/BX8A-GGHC] (“In the 
nation in 2013, 48.1 percent of violent crimes and 19.7 percent of property 
crimes were cleared by arrest or exceptional means.”). 
261. See supra Part III.A.3 (explaining that certainty of apprehension is what 
provides deterrent effects to offenders). 
262. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010) (noting that individuals are less 
likely to take the punishment into consideration when making decisions to 
offend “particularly . . . when that punishment is rarely imposed”). 
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alone, it seems that the deterrence rationale for sentencing nonviolent 
offenders to life without parole sentences “does not overcome other obj-
ections . . . .”263 Therefore, the Court must decide what it makes of the 
other penological justifications as well. 
b. Retribution 
Retribution describes the theory that punishment can be valid if 
the state uses it to ensure that an individual who commits a wrong 
gives up something—for example, freedom—in return. On this theory, 
the offender deserves to be punished because he has harmed a victim 
or society. The Court has described the “goal of retribution” as fulfilling 
“society’s and the victim’s interests in seeing that the offender is repaid 
for the hurt he caused.”264 
Imposing life without parole sentences on individuals who have 
committed nonviolent offenses takes retribution beyond its breaking 
point. Retribution relies on the idea that an “offender receive exactly 
the amount of punishment he deserves for the crime committed, and 
receive no more or no less.”265 It is difficult to imagine that our society 
countenances the notion that someone should be locked up forever 
without the possibility of release because she committed a crime that 
did no direct harm to another person. Therefore, “there are certainly 
some crimes that, particularly . . . nonviolent crimes, may not be 
justifiable for Eighth Amendment purposes by the penological goal of 
retribution.”266 As the Court has put it, “[r]etribution is a legitimate 
reason to punish, but it cannot support the sentence at issue here.”267 
c. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation refers to the penological goal of treating and training 
offenders so that they can effectively reintegrate into society and be-
come law-abiding individuals. It is premised on the theory that some 
 
263. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008). 
264. Id. at 442. 
265. Berry III, supra note 162, at 1135. 
266. Id. at 1136. 
267. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 
(1982) (“Putting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he did not 
commit and had no intention of committing or causing does not measurably 
contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just 
deserts.”). Indeed, it appears the Court has questioned retribution’s validity 
or at least indicated that it is the least persuasive penological justification 
because it is the one “that most often can contradict the law’s own ends.” 
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420. “When the law punishes by death” and other 
extremely harsh punishments, “it risks its own sudden descent into brutality, 
transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint.” Id. 
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causes of criminal behavior can be addressed. As far as the life without 
parole punishment is concerned, rehabilitation is not and could not be 
a goal. “A sentence of life imprisonment without parole . . . cannot be 
justified by the goal of rehabilitation. The penalty forswears altogether 
the rehabilitative ideal. By denying the defendant the right to reenter 
the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that 
person’s value and place in society.”268 As one commentator put it: “Life 
without parole, by definition, is a judgment that an individual cannot 
be rehabilitated.”269 
d. Incapacitation  
Incapacitation represents the concept that crimes can be prevented 
by physically removing offenders from society and thereby curtailing 
their opportunities to commit further crimes. It turns on the assump-
tion that the incarcerated offender, if free, would engage in more crim-
inal activity. Policymakers often rely upon incapacitation as the key 
tool for reducing recidivism.270 
The Supreme Court has recognized that incapacitation can be a 
powerful justification for some harsh sentencing regimes. In Ewing, the 
Court noted that “[r]ecidivism is a serious public safety con-
cern . . . throughout the Nation.”271 In terms of addressing that 
concern, “it is hard to dispute the efficacy of imprisonment: those in 
prison don’t commit any new crimes except against guards and other 
inmates, and so by extending the periods of imprisonment . . . we 
extend the period where the inmate cannot re-offend.”272 Though there 
are clear societal and public safety benefits to keeping individuals likely 
to engage in more criminal activity behind bars,273 there are also 
substantial costs and concerns – many of which are now being raised 
and discussed by lawmakers around the country. 
 
268. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. 
269. Berry III, supra note 162, at 1135. In fact, “[a]s a matter of policy, some 
prisons categorically deny drug treatment, counseling, vocational and 
educational programs, and other rehabilitative services to prisoners who 
are sentenced to die in prison and are ineligible for parole. Other prisons 
limit LWOP prisoners’ access to such rehabilitative services on account 
of their sentences.” Turner & Bunting, supra note 4, at 189. 
270. Andrew D. Leipold, Recidivism, Incapacitation, and Criminal Sentencing 
Policy, 3 U. St. Thomas L.J. 536, 541 (2006) (“[O]ne simple explanation 
for the increasing prison population is that incapacitation works.”). 
271. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003). 
272. Leipold, supra note 270, at 542. 
273. See id. at 543 (“[T]he best reading of the data suggests that former 
inmates in general re-offend at high rates.”). 
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When a court hands down a life without parole sentence, that 
sentence represents a “determination that the individual will always be 
dangerous to society.”274 These determinations are often problematic 
because “incontrovertible scientific evidence demonstrates that future 
dangerousness determinations are, at best, wildly speculative.”275 When 
sentencers get it wrong, there is no recourse. At no point will any 
judicial or executive body be asked to revisit the initial assessment 
because there is no opportunity at all for parole. Life without parole 
sentences also prove insensitive to the reality that recidivism rates de-
cline as offenders get older.276 For this reason, it is “quite doubtful . . . 
whether such a long and inflexible sentence as LWOP can ever be 
justified on incapacitation grounds, given the very low recidivism rates 
of elderly ex-convicts.”277 
Particularly in the context of individuals convicted of nonviolent 
offenses, the financial costs of lifetime incarceration may outweigh the 
risks that come with less severe term-of-year sentences or even the mere 
possibility of paroling an inmate who has served some significant 
amount of time. “Keeping the elderly and infirm in prison is extra-
ordinarily costly.”278 And, though there are costs on the other side (for 
example, the economic costs of additional crimes committed by released 
offenders), the marginal incapacitative benefit of denying individuals 
the opportunity to even seek parole seems slim. 
As the Court recognized in Ewing and again in Graham, 
incapacitation is “an important goal.”279 It is also a goal that is undoubt-
edly achieved when someone is sentenced to die in prison; that 
individual will never commit a crime outside of the prison walls again. 
But, achieving that goal comes at a great cost. It means denying out-
right the possibility of release to many individuals who would not 
commit another crime or who will be rehabilitated. And, it means reaff-
irming the idea that nonviolent crimes can warrant an extraordinarily 
harsh punishment just short of the death penalty. While incapacitation 
 
274. Berry III, supra note 162, at 1132. 
275. Id. 
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can plausibly provide a partial justification for life without parole sent-
ences imposed for nonviolent offenses, it alone cannot withstand the 
weight of the Eighth Amendment challenge in light of the other con-
cerns such sentences raise. 
4. International Opinion 
In its independent judgment analysis, the Court sometimes consid-
ers how other countries approach the challenged punishment. This 
factor—the status of international opinion—is never “controlling” of 
the “outcome,” but it “does provide respected” input for the Court’s 
“own conclusions.”280 Where the Court has found a punishment uncon-
stitutional under its Eighth Amendment categorical analysis, it “has 
treated the laws and practices of other nations and international 
agreements as relevant . . . because the judgment of the world’s nations 
that a particular sentencing practice is inconsistent with basic principles 
of decency demonstrates that the Court’s rationale has respected 
reasoning to support it.”281 
On the question of life without parole sentences, the international 
community appears to have largely rejected the punishment, especially 
for nonviolent offenses. According to the ACLU: 
Today, the United States is virtually alone in its willingness to 
sentence nonviolent offenders to die behind bars . . . . Such 
sentences are rare in other countries and were recently ruled a 
violation of human rights in a landmark decision by the European 
Court of Human Rights that would require an opportunity for 
review of the sentences of 49 prisoners serving LWOP (for 
murder) in the United Kingdom—one of only two countries in 
Europe that still sentence prisoners to LWOP.282 
Moreover, the Rome Statute, which has been signed by almost 100 
nations, requires that life sentences for all crimes, including the most 
violent ones, be subject to review after twenty-five years.283 There are 
no readily available figures detailing the number of individuals under 
sentence of life without parole for nonviolent offenses, but only about 
twenty percent of countries use life without parole at all, and of those 
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a majority only imposes it for violent offenses in limited circum-
stances.284 
The international opinion factor does not clearly establish universal 
disapproval of the punishment, but it points toward a widespread 
rejection. The factor here plays a role similar to the one it played in 
Graham. There, the Court found that “only 11 nations authorize life 
without parole for juvenile offenders under any circumstances; and only 
2 of them [including the United States] . . . ever impose the punishment 
in practice.”285 So, even where the evidence of international consensus 
is not as powerful as it was in Simmons—where the U.S. was “the only 
country in the world that continue[d] to give official sanction” to the 
challenged practice—the factor can still confirm an independent judg-
ment that life without parole is an excessive punishment for nonviolent 
offenses.286 
Conclusion 
This Article put into context and evaluated the claim that society’s 
evolving standards of decency make life without the possibility of parole 
sentences for nonviolent offenses unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment. The historical backdrop for this severe sentencing practice 
is one in which there was a widespread fear of drugs and politicians 
perceived that they had to appear tough on crime to win and retain 
their elected positions. Caught up in a web of various sentencing 
policies—including mandatory minimums, habitual offender laws, and 
three strikes regimes—some 3,000+ offenders were sentenced to life 
without the possibility of parole even though the crime for which they 
were convicted did not entail any violence. As legislators at the federal 
and state levels as well as the President and governors move away from 
exceptionally harsh sentencing practices, especially for drug offenses 
and less serious crimes, these offenders’ sentences appear more and more 
out of step with contemporary punishment norms. State laws, actual 
sentencing practices, and the steady movement away from policies like 
mandatory minimums demonstrate that there is an emerging national 
consensus against life without parole for nonviolent offenses. If the 
Court continues to employ its categorical Eighth Amendment approach 
when a challenge to a punishment is based on the nature of the offense, 
there is substantial persuasive evidence both of a national consensus 
and that the Court’s independent judgment should move it to strike 
down the sentencing practice.  
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